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Abstract  
 
The article traces the main stages of the history of psychoanalytic social psychology in German speaking 
countries. Beginning with Freud, it illuminates the Freudomarxists, Critical theory, the developments during the 
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Introduction 
 
Psychoanalytic social psychology aims and aimed at integrating psychoanalysis into the 
analysis of politics, history, and society in order to unveil their respective conscious and 
unconscious subjective factors. This kind of social psychology had been established at several 
German speaking universities, such as Frankfurt, Hannover, Munich, Bremen, Zurich, and 
Salzburg, during the 1960s in the wake of a socio-critical upheaval. In the course of the last 
two centuries, however, it has been increasingly marginalized or eliminated altogether in most 
places. This ‘fate’ shared with other critical sciences, has also led to a renewed politicization 
and a rekindling of psychoanalytically oriented critical thought by a younger generation.  
 
We want to seize the possibility offered by the Annual Review of Critical Psychology in order 
to reconstruct the history of the tradition of psychoanalytic social psychology in German 
speaking countries, which has spanned more than a hundred years by now, and to open up 
                                                            
1 Translated by Nora Ruck 
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possibilities of updating it. We focus on the main traditions and developments until the 1980s. 
Over the last thirty years, however, psychoanalytic social psychology has taken up a number 
of new issues. It has, for example, incorporated reflections on adolescence and organization 
theory and has focused on empirical studies drawing on psychoanalytic methods, sometimes 
at the cost of meta-psychological concepts. Reconstructing all of these developments would 
expand this text out of proportion, primarily because they are related to the question of 
whether the political and socio-critical potential of psychoanalytic social psychology has 
changed or even waned.  
 
Integrating psychoanalysis into critical social theory does not come without problems. The 
history of psychoanalytic social psychology reveals a number of pitfalls that have 
accompanied it: Over and over, psychoanalytic social psychological texts exert psychologistic 
reductions or even naturalizations or biologizations of social relations and phenomena. On the 
other hand, there are also sociologistic or ‘culturalist’ reductions, which ignore the 
contradictions within subjects, or ‘idealistic’ perspectives that do away with human ‘nature’ 
altogether. Psychoanalytic social psychology has to fend off both kinds of reductionism. 
Taking issue with the potential but also the limits of psychoanalytic knowledge and its 
relation to social theory is fundamental.  
 
Debates on the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociology have always delved into 
the question concerning which psychoanalysis and in what way this psychoanalysis should be 
performed. German speaking psychoanalytic social psychology has mainly referred to the 
writings of Freud himself. However, the exact manner of interpreting and handling them has 
always been an embattled field. Psychoanalytic social psychologists soon discovered that 
meta-psychological problems are indispensable for a socio-critical and political reception of 
psychoanalysis, not least because Freud’s meta-psychology addresses the constitution of 
subjectivity and the role played by inner nature and outer reality.  
 
Historicizing psychoanalytic knowledge is necessary: Freud did not analyze ‘humans as such’ 
but subjects that were constituted by a bourgeois-capitalist, patriarchal, and colonial society; 
the ideals that marked psychological development as ‘normal’ and ‘successful’ or ‘deviant’ 
and ‘pathological’ are also determined by this socio-historic frame.  
 
The kind of psychoanalytic critical social psychology we introduce in this paper has mostly 
been rather self-sufficient and focused on certain debates in German speaking countries. This 
isolation has its pitfalls, which we will discuss in our conclusion, but also has its 
advantages.The isolation of psychoanalytic critical social psychology allows us, at least, to set 
limits to our presentation and makes it legitimate for us to restrict our reflections on the 
history of psychoanalytic social psychology to German speaking countries – with the 
exception of writings and debates of German authors exiled to America. Astonishingly, such 
an overview of psychoanalytic social psychology, also called ‘analytic social psychology’ 
(Fromm), ‘political psychology’ (Brückner, Horn), or ‘critical theory of the subject’ 
(Lorenzer), has not been published.
2
  
                                                            
2 Firstly, however, there are anthologies presenting papers compiled in historical perspective: For example, 
anthologies edited by Dahmer (1980) that contain the psychoanalytic, social psychological writings of Freud up 
until the 1980s and the documentations of marxism-psychoanalysis-debates from the 1920s and 1960s by 
Sandkühler (1971) and Gente (1970). Secondly, we want to point to monographs that deal with certain aspects 
and phases of the history of psychoanalytic social psychology, above all, we owe Dahmer’s (1982) analysis of 
Freud and the Freudian left of the 1920s/1930s a great deal. Furthermore, Brückner (1982), Krovoza/Schneider 
(1988), Busch (2001), and Emmerich (2007) deserve mention. The recent introduction to ›critical psychology‹ 
by Abl (2007), which gives much room to the leftist reception of psychoanalysis, almost seems like a revival of 
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Our overview makes no claims of being complete. Rather, we want to offer a historic 
overview of the main characteristics and developments of German speaking critical 
psychoanalytic social psychology, commencing with Freud and his culture theoretical 
attempts, in the first part of our paper. Here, we reflect changes in research questions and 
theoretical concepts in relation to historical changes to some extent. In the second part, we 
provide some insights into thematic debates about the major topics of psychoanalytic social 
psychology: authoritarianism, processes of inclusion and exclusion, National Socialism and 
its consequences, and questions regarding the constitution of gendered subjects. In the short 
third part of our paper, we present debates that focus on methodological issues of 
psychoanalytic social psychology. In our conclusion, we discuss omissions and possible 
future directions and actualizations of critical psychoanalytic social psychology.  
 
1. Historical development 
 
1.1. Freud 
 
“The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk,” says Hegel (1821, p. 
13).
3
 Freudian psychoanalysis, too, came into being at the dusk of the nineteenth century, 
when classical bourgeois society had already started to crumble and to enter its imperialistic 
phase. With it, the (gendered) bourgeois subject, who would lie on Freud’s couch, eroded as 
well and revealed, in its innermost core, the contradictions of bourgeois capitalist society as 
inner psychological conflicts. This erosion of the subject influenced Freudian theory as much 
as the societal crisis phenomena of the time: The First World War, the flare-up of 
nationalisms, the social struggles, and, finally, the global economic crisis and the advent of 
the National Socialist Movement. Freud’s psychoanalysis can be read as an attempt to write a 
critical theory of bourgeois society from the perspective of the “mental frontiers of this 
world” (Freud 1985, S. 273), albeit in a psychologistic, a-historical, naturalistic, and 
mythologized manner. Marxist psychoanalysts saw this critical potential for an analysis of 
societal phenomena early on, started to immerse themselves in Freud’s writings, and read 
them against the grain in a socio-critical manner.  
 
As Dahmer (1975) has shown, Freud’s work already contains many themes and questions that 
have marked the history of psychoanalytic critical social psychology, and which were taken 
up or critically interrogated by later authors.  
 
1. Critical subject theory 
 
Freud stressed that his individual psychology is, “is at the same time social psychology as 
well” (Freud, 1921, p. 69) – but it is even more so than Freud himself conceptualized. In his 
analyses, Freud revealed “nature” as socially developed “pseudo-nature” (Dahmer, 1994, title, 
transl. NR): He was not interested in ‘drives’ themselves. Freud self-critically called his drive 
theory his “mythology” (Freud, 1933, p. 95), thus indicating that it was mainly a heuristic 
instrument. He was rather interested in specific “vicissitudes of the drive” (Freud 1915) that 
are structured by social interactions and which he tried to trace in the clinical setting with the 
help of his critical-hermeneutic method. In their ‘pathologies’ and their failure to live up to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
debates from the 1920s that centered around the question of whether psychoanalysis was Marxist, i.e., 
materialistic and dialectic, enough.  
3 When possible, we have adopted direct quotes from existing English translations, which are referenced in 
brackets after the German references. Quotes from texts that have either not been translated into English or the 
translations of which were not accessible to us have been translated by Nora Ruck.  
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the standards of ‘successful’ socialization, his patients unveiled the structuring factors of 
gendered bourgeois ‘normality’: Their suffering was social suffering. In their unresolved 
inner conflicts, social contradictions became apparent. Freud did realize this, inquiring about 
the necessary conditions of ‘normal development’ and showing that allegedly ‘pathological’ 
psychological mechanisms can be found ontogenetically in all people and structurally in all 
major social institutions.  
 
Freud, however, had neither a notion of the society in which he lived nor a truly historical 
view of the people and phenomena he analyzed. He rather vaguely equated society with 
‘culture,’ and analyzed the very interactions that shaped his analysands only within the a-
historic confines of the (bourgeois nuclear) family. Thus naturalizing (bourgeois) society and 
its hegemonic family constellations and gender relations, he also essentialized vicissitudes of 
the drive which are structured by society at large, and by family and gender relations.  
 
In order to fully unfold the socio-critical potential of Freud’s subject theory, his theoretical 
notions must be freed from family-centrism as well as ontological mystification and be 
historicized and socially contextualized. Such a founding in terms of social theory and thus 
politics would also define the limits of the therapeutic process: Psychoanalysis can reveal the 
social contradictions that have solidified in inner psychological conflicts and find ways to 
transform “[neurotic] misery into common unhappiness” (Freud/Breuer 1895, p. 305); the 
basic conflicts, however, could only be resolved by completely overthrowing the ruling social 
relations.  
 
2. Cultural criticism 
 
Freud repeatedly addressed social questions and, from the 1920s on, he developed a theory of 
(bourgeois) culture. His theory recognized that bourgeois culture is based on violence on the 
one hand and the self-discipline required of its members on the other hand. In the beginning 
(e.g., Freud, 1908a), he sketched a rather simple repressive relationship between sexuality and 
cultural sexual mores, thus formulating the conflict between individual and society as an 
external one. With reflections that foreshadow the later psychoanalytic structural model (id-
ego-superego; Freud, 1914a), it becomes increasingly clear that the vicissitudes of drive and 
culture are intertwined, and that Freud has sketched a “dialectic of culture” (Marcuse, 1955).  
 
Culture depends on human drives but needs to refuse their immediate satisfaction at the same 
time: In order to control outer nature, culture must subject individuals to compulsory labor 
and to rationality, it must annihilate desires and ‘channel’ or sublimate drive impulses. 
Furthermore, pacifying the ‘cultural community’ internally requires that norms and ideals of 
communal life are internalized and that people identify themselves with the community. 
Internalizing the constraints and ideals that constitute culture in the form of the super-ego, 
which gains its strength from tabooed aggressive and culturally inimical tendencies, produces 
permanent feelings of guilt – “Civilization and its Discontents” (Freud, 1930) –, which grows 
with the progress of culture but promotes progress at the same time.
4
 If the renouncements 
and work efforts imposed on the individual are not compensated for adequately, the conflicts 
produced in the individual lead to mental illnesses – or are acted out socially, often in the 
form of violence.  
 
                                                            
4 In his “scientific myth” about the band of brothers that murders the authoritarian primal father and, in an act of 
retroactive obedience, internalize his norms and make them the fundament of culture, Freud projects this 
dialectic onto the origin of human cultural development (see Freud, 1912-13; 1939). 
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In most of his culture theoretical works, Freud only describes a somewhat abstract ‘culture.’ 
In The Future of an Illusion (1927), however, he discusses ‘culture’ as a class society that is 
based on exploitation and repression and in which the majority of people are subjected to 
coerced work whereas a small minority reap the rewards. If this domination is increasingly 
revealed as irrational by the erosion of religious justification, it is to be expected that the 
repressed will refuse to play their part in the game and will destroy culture. This exposition 
leads to Freud’s famous sentence: “It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so 
large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor 
deserves the prospect of a lasting existence” (Freud, 1927, p. 12). 
 
Though Freud’s reasoning contains a historical approach that allows for the appearance of 
another, less dissatisfying culture: Freud regarded the “the great experiment in civilization” 
(Freud, 1927, p. 9) in the Soviet Union with legitimate suspicion. The dialectic on the basis of 
culture and the individual’s tragic position that goes along with it cannot be solved in his 
view. This ontologization of social relations may seem problematic, but his “pessimism contre 
Coeur” (Eissler, 1985; transl. NR) can also be read as an unconditional commitment to the 
repressed. His psychologistic take on society carries a critical potential: it persistently focuses 
on the suffering of individuals, measures alleged cultural ‘accomplishments’ against the 
measuring stick of human suffering, and reveals that culture is structured by coercion and 
violence.  
 
At the same time, Freud’s notion that sociology “cannot be anything but applied psychology” 
(Freud, 1932, p. 179) also shows the problematic aspects of his perspective from the 
viewpoint of the “mental frontiers of this world”: Freud does not have a theory of the social, 
and so he de-historicizes and ontologizes bourgeois society and the autonomous, rational 
individual produced by it. Furthermore, his attention to human suffering reaches its limits 
where a fundamental critique of society would be at stake (e.g., in relation to the coercive 
nature of work and gender relations, which he recognizes in principle). In this case, he affirms 
the socially required discipline and its demands for psychological repression.  
 
A major question for psychoanalytic social psychology arose somewhat later: How can its 
ontologizing tendencies be countered by a form of historiography that does not lose the 
critical potential which, paradoxically, arises from the allegedly ‘a-historical’ elements of 
psychoanalysis? Two of these elements can he highlighted. First, the resistive ‘depth 
structure’ that distinguishes Freud’s theory as a conflict theory and that characterizes both 
drive theory and the concept of an unconscious that eludes rational access; second, the 
“obsolescence” (Marcuse, 1963) of psychoanalysis: Psychoanalytic insights and notions 
derive from the ideals of classical bourgeois society and allow to reconstruct the erosion of 
the bourgeois subject by means of ideology critique. A de-mythologizing and decrypting of 
Freud’s theory and his basic terms is no doubt necessary. Mythology, however, might also be 
understood as a mimetic approach that makes the ‘other’ of hegemonic rationality accessible 
to reason.  
 
Consequently, the element of the ‘other’ that reaches beyond the status quo does not show as 
a revolutionary movement in Freud’s pessimistic culture theory but in his minor writings, e.g., 
about the critical potential of the joke (1905a) and about aesthetics (e.g., 1908b, 1914b): 
Desires that are buried and repressed in the course of socialization do not only reveal 
themselves in ‘symptoms,’ but are made available for a critique of society by means of a 
playful regression that circumvents censorship and that is at work both in the joke and in art. 
Many authors (e.g., Gross, Reich, Marcuse, Lorenzer, Brückner, Dahmer) have considered it 
fundamental to take this “heap of ruins” (Benjamin, 1940, p. 698; transl. NR) of the life story, 
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as well as repressed possibilities and desires, as a starting point for a psychoanalytically 
inspired theory of revolution.  
 
 
3. Mass psychology 
 
Freud’s writings that are devoted to criticism of religion and to mass psychology offer yet 
another point of departure for further reaching social psychological thoughts: Freud theorized 
social institutions, movements, and ideologies as instances of a “crooked cure” of 
psychological conflicts, aiding in binding anxiety and in canalizing aggressions, and 
promising an illusory participation in power by means of narcissistic identification. They can 
be read as socially necessary buffers, cushioning the antagonisms of bourgeois society for the 
subject, and as stabilizing ideological mechanisms of integration that stand in the way of 
social change: Irrational and/or anachronistic institutions like religion or nation are rigidly 
adhered to because of their psychological function. With the upheaval of National Socialism, 
it stood to reason that the mass psychological analyses of group processes and stereotyping 
carried an important potential (see chapter 2.2.).  
 
Here, it is necessary to historicize the phenomenon of mass psychology It is the eroding 
bourgeois subject, helplessly exposed to the increasingly monopolized production conditions 
as a “solitary individual” (Marx) and in need to compensate the constant narcissistic wounds 
by participating in a “collective narcissism” (Adorno), that is particularly susceptible to these 
mass processes. Freud, however, does not allow for a way out of the cultural dialectic, and so 
his critical perspective on mass processes and the juxtaposed hypostatization of the individual 
completely leaves out the possibility that the collectivization of the solitary individuals may, 
on the one hand, carry a liberating and emancipative potential and is, on the other hand, 
necessary if bourgeois society is to be overcome.  
 
1.2. Freudo-marxism 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Marxist psychoanalysts such as Siegfried Bernfeld, Wilhelm Reich, 
Erich Fromm, and Otto Fenichel made efforts to integrate Freudian insights into Marxism. In 
view of the failed socialist revolution in Germany and the experiences of the Second World 
War, their main goal was to understand why the workers did not revolt against the oppressive 
conditions under which they lived, and why the ‘ideology of the rulers,’ i.e., bourgeois ideals 
and, particularly, the nationalism that obscured class relations, entered the (unconscious) 
emotional lives of the ruled. In this regard, they devoted increasing attention to the uprising 
National Socialist Movement, which drove all proponents of the Freudian left into exile in 
America.  
These psychoanalysts not only authored the first programmatic writings ever on the relation 
between psychoanalysis and sociology (Bernfeld, 1926; Reich 1929; Fromm, 1932; Fenichel 
1934), but also the first psychoanalytically inspired analyses on authoritarianism (see chapter 
2.1.), fascism, and the relation between social relations, hegemonic family structures, and the 
resulting character structures. They accomplished a first historiography of Freudian terms and 
concepts which, however, remained stuck half way and cemented Freud’s naturalizations even 
more at times: Arguing against ‘idealism,’ which was held against ‘humanistic’ psychology of 
the time from a Marxist perspective, these authors made a case for psychoanalysis as a 
‘dialectic-materialistic’ natural science. Albeit in their different approaches, all of them 
juxtaposed a biological world of drives to social ‘outer stimuli’ which were hypothesized to 
‘act upon’ the drives. Their emphasis on social relations allowed them to come up against 
psychologisms and to conceptualize human thought and action as deeply historical, but with 
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the opposition between ‘organism and environment,’ derived from biology, they set limits to 
the intertwining of individual and society: Within the simple contradistinction between 
biological drive structure and social deformation, the basis for deviation and resistance needed 
to be sought after in the drives and when the critique of biologism was driven further it 
evolved into a rather idealistic recourse to ethics (see especially Fromm, chapter 1.3.; see for a 
critique Dahmer, 1973). Both nature and ethics were coupled with idealized notions of 
matriarchy, thus cementing bourgeois gender relations and naturalizing social images of 
femininity and maternity (see Gross, 1916, 1919a; Reich, 1932; Fromm, 1934). 
 
This tendency is already evident in the works of the first leftist psychoanalyst Otto Gross, 
who was not a Marxist, but an anarchist. Conceptualizing the conflicts revealed by Freud as 
an internalization of the conflicts between the individual’s self-realization efforts and an 
authoritarian society, he realized that conflicts were social in nature. Hence, he could 
deconstruct the bourgeois-patriarchal nuclear family as well as some of its dominating images 
of femininity and masculinity and reveal their pseudo-nature (see Gross, 1919b, 1920). This 
was only made possible for him, however, by trading the alleged Freudian biologism by the 
even more biologistic notion of an “inborn character” (Gross, 1916, p. 27; transl. NR). This 
inborn character is conceptualized as a (gendered) natural mechanism of self-regulation that is 
intrinsically altruistic. It is suppose to guarantee that people can live together harmoniously 
and free from domination under the auspices of (see Gross, 1919).  
While Gross attacked patriarchal family structures, Wilhelm Reich – at least for a while – 
provided psychoanalysis with the foundation of a Marxist inspired social theory, historicized 
the bourgeois nuclear family, and gave room to social momentum. In his programmatic 
reflection on the relation between sociology and psychology, he tried to narrow the subject of 
psychoanalysis down to individual psychological questions, thus forfeiting the entire potential 
of Freudian culture theory (see Reich, 1929, 1934). In contrast with the limits he himself set 
to the scope of his reflections, his approach increasingly boiled down to Gross’s “repression 
hypothesis” (Foucault, 1976). He, too, started from the assumption of a natural “sex-
economy’ and, celebrating genital sex, equated it with “orgastic potency.” He assumed that 
this sex-economy was repressed by present society with its hostility towards sexuality. 
Accordingly, his political-practical activism centered on the liberation of this self-regulation 
principle.
5
 Reich suggested a division of labor between psychology and sociology which 
informed his work Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933; see chapter 1933). In this book, he 
first analyzed the rise of National Socialism within the framework of Marxist analyses of 
fascism of the time. Later, however, he considered fascism a mere matter of a fascist 
mentality. His sexual revolutionary program was supposed to counter this mentality. He 
believed that the sexual revolution would unfold orgastic potency which, in turn, would free 
individuals from their neuroses, would automatically do away with mystic, religious, and 
fascist orientations, and bring with it harmonizing social ethics and (deeply bourgeois) ideals 
such as self-sufficiency, desire to work, heterosexuality, and monogamy (see Reich, 1927, 
1936) .
6
  
 
Otto Fenichel was probably the harshest critic of such psychologism: In many sharp and 
precise polemics, he tirelessly countered attempts to grasp social phenomena like class 
                                                            
5 This activism resulted in his exclusion not only from the Psychoanalytic Association but also from the 
Communist Party. Freud fought against too offensive a politicization of the psychoanalytic movement, afraid 
psychoanalysis might be endangered. Reich, as Gross before him, was erased from the historical self-narrative of 
psychoanalysis.  
6 In the course of his search for the biological basis of this sex-economy, which he intensified during the 1920ies 
(see Reich, 1923), he discovered the orgon, a cosmological ›life energy‹ that won him considerable popularity in 
esoteric circles (see Reich, 1942).  
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domination, war, and criminality by psychoanalytic means, while leaving aside genuinely 
sociological perspectives (see Fenichel, 1932, 1934, 1935). To Fenichel, it was relations of 
social dominance and the resulting objective conflicting interests that needed to be analyzed. 
His writings are also based on the conflict between biological drives and social reality that 
culminate in mental life with their interaction.
7
 And he, too, tried to divide the Marxist 
analysis of society and psychoanalysis by virtue of their subject matter: in the case of neurotic 
behavior, temperament and childhood development needed to be focused on, whereas in non-
neurotic, e.g., mass psychological behavior, the study of the actual social situation is called 
for, because he considered drive structure a relative natural constant (see Fenichel, 1934, 
1946). Fenichel’s fear of psychologisms is understandable. However, his biologistic 
misunderstanding of drives foreclosed insights into the complex interrelation of biographic 
experience and actual social situation that is at work in mass dynamics (see chapter 2.2.). 
Later, however, Fenichel would criticize authors like Fromm and Horney – in a similar 
manner in which they were criticized by Adorno and Marcuse (see chapter 2.3.) – for 
adhering to a sociologism that had done away with the unconscious and with libido theory 
altogether. Siegfried Bernfeld is certainly the most advanced author of his generation as far as 
epistemological reflections on psychoanalysis and its relation to Marxist social theory are 
concerned. In his attempt to analyze the left youth movement he was involved with, Bernfeld 
failed with the project of an anti-authoritarian, socialist education due to the reality of 
bourgeois society. After this, he wrote a fundamental ideology critique of bourgeois 
pedagogy: in capitalist society, the objective function of education was to sustain class 
society, and the critical educator’s work was a “Sisyphos”-work within these constraints 
(Bernfeld, 1925). The only way out, according to Bernfeld, was the revolutionary overthrow 
of society. This early work was already influenced by psychoanalysis and proves his profound 
insight into the ideological mechanisms of class society. Soon, Bernfeld turned his full 
attention to psychoanalysis. Though Bernfeld regards psychoanalysis as a natural science, 
thus trying to make it inaccessible to ideology critique, he strictly tries to avoid reductionist 
thinking in order to integrate psychoanalysis into Marxism (see his writings on Reich in 
particular: Bernfeld, 1932). He takes Freud’s claim that individual psychology is always 
social psychology as well very seriously. Thus, he developed the concept of a “social 
location” (Bernfeld, 1929; transl. NR) as a new psychoanalytic perspective, showing that 
‘vicissitudes of the drive’ can only be understood against the backdrop of a thorough 
reflection of the class specific and milieu specific social location of the individual. This 
location not only brings about psychological conflicts and enables, reduces, or canalizes 
certain conflict solving strategies, but also determines whether a symptom causes suffering, 
whether a certain behavior is classified as ‘pathological,’ and whether a sublimation is 
considered as ‘successful.’ Early approaches of a sophisticated psychoanalytically inspired 
empirical social research are evident in Bernfeld’s work: in his reflections on criminality and 
neglect (Bernfeld, 1929, 1931a, b), he accepts both psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives 
on social phenomena rather un-dogmatically, sewing the two of them together by means of 
the (social theoretical) notion of the ‘social location,’ and anticipating Adorno’s refusal to 
immediately link sociology and psychology (see chapter 1.3.).  
Ernst Simmel, who organized a discussion on socialism and psychoanalysis together with 
Bernfeld in 1926 (see Bernfeld, 1926), had encountered psychoanalysis when treating ‘war 
neurotics’ as a military surgeon during the First World War. In short-term treatments he 
realized that the major causes for the soldiers’ traumatic breakdown were related to military 
discipline, which produced an authority bound and combat-ready ‘military ego’ that would be 
loyal into death, and which systematically destroyed the military members’ ‘civic’ ego-
                                                            
7 As Dahmer (1972) emphasizes, Fenichel turned more dialectic in regards to the formation of super-ego and 
character, where subject and social reality are obviously intertwined.  
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structures and their mechanisms of coping with anxiety (see Simmel, 1919, 1944a). 
According to Simmel (1920) due to this transformation, many soldiers had trouble integrating 
into civic society after 1918, a fact which Simmel later (1932) held responsible for the 
particular allure the National Socialist Movement had for these men. With its authoritarian 
leadership structure and its Manichaean world view, National Socialism (re-)produced a 
permanent state of war. Simmel’s engagement to provide therapeutic help for the poor and to 
effect the necessary health care reforms were followed by what are probably the most 
intriguing reflections on the relation between individual conflicts and mass dynamics written 
in his generation. His writings were marked by a biologistic notion of drives, too – at the core 
of his theory are ‘cannibalistic’ instincts to devour (see Simmel, 1944b) that allegedly need to 
be tamed socially. Nevertheless, Simmel showed in a very dynamic manner how participating 
in collectively ‘normalized’ delusions like nationalism and anti-Semitism served to restore an 
individual mental balance that had been disrupted by social anxieties (see Simmel, 1944a, 
1946; Pohl 2000; see also chapter 2.2.). 
 
1.3. Critical theory 
 
Critical theory tried to avoid both the biologistic and the sociologistic pitfalls of Freudo-
marxism that resulted from the simple division between the disciplines sociology and 
psychology. It was certainly the most influential result of Freudo-Marxist discussions for 
West Germany’s intellectual life and was developed at the Frankfurt Institute of Social 
Research (Institut für Sozialforschung IfS) in Frankfurt am Main from the 1930s on and 
during the protagonists’ exile in the USA. Its social theory was inspired by Western Marxism 
(Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács) and its subject theory by Freudian psychoanalysis. Critical 
theorists aimed at developing an “interdisciplinary materialism” that recognized 
psychoanalysis as an “an indispensable auxiliary science for history” (Horkheimer 1932, p. 
119). The researchers at the IfS asked why people of the developed capitalist countries did not 
aim at social emancipation but – in the case of Germany – chose National Socialism and thus 
their increased incapacitation instead. And also the supposed emancipatory Russian 
Revolution ended in a Stalinist disaster. These tragic social developments were analyzed 
against the backdrop of a “dialectic of enlightenment” which spanned the entire history of 
civilization. This project was designed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947) and in Critique of Instrumental 
Reason (Horkheimer, 1947) and is one of the last attempts to write a ‘grand narrative’ since: it 
is neither culture pessimistic nor adheres to a Hegelian or Marxist hopeful teleology but 
elaborates the negative dialectic of progress instead. Psychoanalysis plays a central part in this 
historico-philosophical conceptualization of a long process of social rationalization. While 
‘work’ became the central mode of dominating nature in a historic process, mental structures 
changed accordingly: The act of pacifying the gods with sacrificial offerings was increasingly 
turned inwards as a self-disciplined abdication of immediate satisfaction: “The history of 
civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice” (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947, p. 43). 
Guided by the dictates of ego and super-ego which developed in the historical process, the 
spontaneity of the drives (of inner nature) is canalized and utilized.  
At first, this process promised freedom and independence from the demands of nature, but it 
also brought about a subject that is rather untouched by drive impulses, that is not able to set 
its own goals, and that thus becomes compliant with whatever power. In contrast to this, 
Adorno and Horkheimer posed the “remembrance of nature within the subject” 
(Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947, p. 32) without regressing into the sort of ”back into nature” 
(Horkheimer, 1947, p. 87) that was promised by National Socialism when it took hold of 
human drives.  
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This abstract history of civilization provides the framework in which critical theorists 
formulated their diagnoses of society, asking about the “subjective conditions of objective 
irrationality” (Adorno, 1955a, p. 68) in their respective concrete conditions. The different 
stages of theory development can be distinguished according to the mechanisms proposed to 
be at work in interrelating social structure and subject structure. 
 
Erich Fromm, the director of the social psychological department at the IfS, knew Reich’s 
work and partly built on it in developing the concept of a “social character”. This approach 
brings together the social system, the schooling of children, and the resulting character 
structure in a rather deductive manner. From this perspective, capitalist society is said to bring 
about the patriarchal nuclear family, which in turn is supposed to install repressive 
educational methods, which again allegedly lead to a specific orientation and fixation of 
vicissitudes of the drive in the sado-masochist character structure. According to Fromm, this 
social character structure was responsible for the affective attraction of submitting to an 
authoritarian (political) ‘leader’ (see Fromm, 1936, 1941, Jay 1973).  
 
This concept was also taken up by the study The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 
1950; see also chapter 2.1.) that was conducted and written during Adorno’s exile in America. 
Social psychological approaches now seemed important for different reasons, though. The 
authors still sought to explain why the revolution did not take place but now they also 
inquired whether the US population supported a fascist coming to power and tried to build the 
theoretical and empirical grounds for psychological-pedagogical countermeasures.  
After the war, and after Horkheimer and Adorno had returned to Frankfurt, Adorno turned his 
attention to matters of a democratic education with preventative effects against a return of 
National Socialism in several essays and radio programs (Adorno, 1959). In particular, he 
emphasized an Education for Maturity and Responsibility (1969) which would start off in 
early stages of childhood and help avoid the development of authoritarian social characters. 
However, Adorno focuses on education and psychology at the expense of an analysis of social 
structures (see chapter 2.3.).  
 
Already during the exile, Theodor W. Adorno, in particular, started to have doubts about the 
concept of “interdisciplinary materialism. Could psychoanalysis and social theory be 
reconciled so easily? This presupposition, which had also characterized the concept of the 
“social character” was problematized from two different angles> The first problematization 
emphasizes that psychological and social structures cannot be related in a deductive manner. 
During the so-called culturism-dispute, Herbert Marcuse (1955), a member of the IfS who did 
not return to Germany, and Adorno (1952) criticized the proponents of what was now called a 
‘neo-Freudianism’ revision of psychoanalysis, especially Fromm and Karen Horney, for 
forfeiting the critical potential of psychoanalysis for the sake of its “sociologization.”: The 
social individual collapses into social demands, leading him/her to “want to act in the way 
they have to act” (Fromm, 1944, p. 407). Fromm’s work exhibits the typical feature of 
Freudo-marxism according to which deviant behavior could only be explained by recourse to 
an ontological ‘healthy’ individual beneath sexual repression. The IfS broke with Fromm in 
1939.  
 
Adorno provided a different explanation for the friction between subject and society. It is not 
an ontological ‘natural’ relic that resists social colonization and repression but socialization 
itself which plants the seed of resistance. Society itself is contradictory, as primary (family), 
secondary (school), and tertiary (work) socialization confront the individual with conflicting 
demands and constitute different experiences of interaction that are reflected psychologically, 
“while remaining products of the social totality, individuals, as such products, no less 
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necessarily enter into conflict with the totality” (Adorno, 1955a, p. 72). The “non-identical” 
within the psyche, defying cultural demands and social constraints, is a residue of early 
childhood that then allowed for different interactions than the later context of the ‘facts of 
life.’ When the individual fantasizes about this (now seemingly idyllic) early stage later in 
life, a yearning to “catch up with one’s childhood by transforming it” (Adorno, 1962a, p. 395; 
transl. NR) is brought to life. This yearning can clash against social demands of self-control 
and rationality.  
 
The second problematization of the concept of the social character points in the opposite 
direction. It is not the friction between psychological and social structure but the illusion of a 
historic coming about of social characters that is emphasized here. According to Marcuse, the 
social totality is developed in such a way as to rub out the contradictions between the different 
socialization levels and brought about a “one-dimensional man” (Marcuse 1964). For this 
reason, psychoanalysis became increasingly obsolete (Marcuse 1963). The ego had mediated 
between the psychological apparatus and the outer world, which had provided access to the 
power of the “non-identitcal” in its failure, but was now fading away. Even the 
psychodynamics of the ‘authoritarian character,’ who was proven to be rather inflexible and 
uncooperative in the face of social change, gave way to a manipulative “characterless 
character” (Weyand, 2001, p. 140; transl. NR), short-circuiting super-ego and id. As Adorno 
notes, “The superego becomes the spokesman of the id” (Adorno, quoted after: Ziege, 2009, 
p. 270; transl. NR). Utterly conformist attitudes thus seem spontaneous to the individual. 
Adorno (1951) shows this by using the example of the mass psychological dynamics of 
National Socialism: The “show’ of “Volksgemeinschaft” (folk community) and “anti-
Semitism” is not mediated by any ego. Nevertheless, and maybe even because of this, self-
incapacitation seems like self-realization to the “people” (see chapter 2.2.), and the 
discontents about culture succumb to a “yearning after the absolutely hollow ‘warmth’ of 
authoritarian communities and military ‘campfire romanticism’ as well as to the attachment to 
higher authorities and leaders” (Rensmann, 1998, p. 72; transl. NR), defying all subjectivity.  
With the notion of “repressive desublimization,” Marcuse (1964) described a parallel 
development in democratic societies. The dynamics of his time made it seem as if social or 
psychological authorities did not demand suppression or sublimation anymore, and as if the 
freedom to satisfy one’s needs was entirely attainable by consumerism. The “non-identical” 
did not appear as suffering and ex negativo (Adorno, 1966) but was rendered utterly isolated 
and cut off from experience.  
 
Herbert Marcuse agreed with Adorno when diagnosing an increasing “one-dimensionality” 
but held on to the revolutionary potential of the partial drives. Marcuse was prone to 
essentialization, too. In contrast to Fromm, however, who did away with partial drives as 
“infantility” and “refusal to grow up” (Fromm, 1970, pp. 19f), Marcuse did not vouch for 
genital heterosexuality and the alleged ‘mature personality’ going along with genitality, but 
searched for resistance in the chaotic nature of the pre-genital partial drives and their 
perversions, especially the primary narcissistic impulses which indulged in “Nirvana” instead 
of the “merit principle” (Marcuse, 1955) 
The different theoretical positions led to diverging assessments of the revolutionary potential 
of the student protest movements of the late 1960s. Was the “68 generation” a manifestation 
of the non-identical or of a mere conformist, anti-American rebellion? Adorno was highly 
ambivalent as far as the ‘student movement’ was concerned. Apart from the liberating 
tendencies, he also saw the students conform to the changing sexual morals of consumer 
society and resort to anti-intellectual actionism and a complete misjudgment of the historic 
situation with regards to its alleged pre-revolutionary character. Marcuse’s assessment was 
not euphoric, either, but a bit more positive (Kraushaar, 1992). He hoped for the possibility of 
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a narcissistically-pregenitcally motivated “major refusal” as it becomes obvious from his 
writings: 
“The students know that society absorbs any kind of opposition […]. They feel, more or less 
clearly, that the ‘one-dimensional man’ has lost his power to negate, his ability to refuse. It is 
for this reason that they refuse to be integrated into this society”(Marcuse, 1968, pp. 380; 
transl. NR).  
In comparing Adorno’s and Marcuse’s positions, two possible relations between critical 
theory and political movements become cogent. Adorno became rather politically quietist in 
the face of the “one-dimensionalization” of society, whereas Marcuse represents a kind of 
escapism that made him the acclaimed star of the student movement.  
 
1.4. Psychoanalytic social psychology in West German post-war society 
 
Psychoanalysis had become part of critical social psychology in West German post-war 
society because of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s remigration. The establishment of a 
psychoanalytic social psychology that was closely allied to clinical practice, however, was not 
only made uncertain by the expulsion and murder of psychoanalysts by National Socialists: 
Psychoanalysis had been integrated into the National Socialist health care system under the 
name of ›deutsche Seelenkunde‹ (›German study of the soul‹). The heteronomous 
determination of therapeutic goals such as ›combat capability‹ led to a »moral de-
contextualization« and to the loss of the socio-critical potential of psychoanalysis (Schneider 
1993, p. 761; transl. NR): Thus, it became necessary to establish psychoanalysis with a 
special focus on its political and moral dimensions. On the one hand, it was Alexander 
Mitscherlich who promoted a political re-contextualistion of psychoanalysis. On the other 
hand, young scientists in his close circle made use of psychoanalysis for the benefit of a 
critical social psychology in the wake of the protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Alexander Mitscherlich continuously took a moral and political stand on social changes in 
(West) Germany from 1945 until the 1970s, drawing both from his clinical psychoanalytic 
work and from psychoanalytic theories. This already shows in his early works that were not 
even thoroughly psychoanalytic (Mitscherlich/Weber, 1946, Mitscherlich, 1946, Mitscherlich/ 
Mielke, 1948/1960). In his major writings On the Way to a Fatherless Society (1963), The 
Inhospitableness of Our Cities (1965) and The Inability to Mourn (1967, together with 
Margarete Mitscherlich), he offers social psychological diagnoses of West German post-war 
society in which he – not unlike the critical theorists – draws a dreadful picture of an 
“anonymous, de-individualized mass society” (Busch 2001: 101; transl. NR). Mitscherlich 
diagnosed an “ego-depletion in our society” (Mitscherlich, A. and M., 1967, p. 20; transl. NR) 
which becomes apparent as an impaired ability to act upon social institutions actively and 
willfully. His major contribution to psychoanalytic social psychology lies in the fact that he 
always analyzed the conditions of this ego-depletion against the backdrop of the clinical study 
of individual life histories.  
Together with Margarete Mitscherlich, he traced the ego-depletion in society back to the 
defense mechanisms against guilt and against remembering the atrocities of the National 
Socialists that prevailed in many Germans (Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967; compare chapter 
2.4.). Almost at the same time, Mitscherlich (1963) proposed another explanation, focusing on 
the consequences of the historic changes in work conditions on family and political structures. 
According to Mitscherlich, social structures and relations that are handed down to children by 
their parents are hardly concrete and imaginable. By contrast, they are “inaccessible and 
erratic’ (ibid. p. 200; transl. NR) to the individual. For Mitscherlich, this impression grew 
even stronger in the face of political transformation processes that confront the dominated 
with “faceless systems” (transl. NR), bureaucracies and functional machineries of domination. 
As he explained, “One cannot ‘picture’ them albeit subject to them mercilessly” (ibid.; transl. 
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NR), which produces anxiety, aggression, and prejudice (see Mitscherlich, 1953, 1962/63, 
1969, 1977). Despite this dark picture that reminds of Marcuse’s and Adorno’s analyses of a 
‘one-dimensional’ world, his work is remarkably optimistic. Again and again, he intervened 
in social debates with concrete suggestions for change. He demanded the development of a 
“constructive disobedience” (transl. NR) and stood up for “the obligation for dissent or even 
resistance” (Mitscherlich, 1963, p. 356; transl. NR). 
The psychoanalytic social psychologist Mitscherlich was always at pains to be up to date and 
to provide critical cultural diagnoses of his time and political engagement. However, he does 
not draw on the social theories that distinguished the works of the Freudo-marxists and 
critical theory (see chapters 1.2. and 1.3., see Busch 2001). For a critical social psychology, 
this is not only a deficit. His efforts “to reconstruct the imprints of society on the biographies 
of individuals” contain a “political as well as specifically psychological quality” 
Krovoza/Schneider 1989, pp. 135f.; transl. NR) that was missing from the grand social 
theoretical reflections of his successors. This characteristic of Mitscherlich’s work complies 
with the socio-critical re-contextualization of psychoanalysis mentioned above.  
 
It was younger scholars from Mitscherlich’s circles who took up the debate on the relation 
between social theory and psychoanalysis on this basis and against the backdrop of the social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Busch (2001) broadly summarizes this development with 
the term critical theory of the subject and counts Peter Brückner, Helmut Dahmer, Klaus 
Horn, and Alfred Lorenzer among its major proponents.
8
 
 
Helmut Dahmer (1973, 1975) analyzes psychoanalysis as to its potential for a critique of 
ideology, while Alfred Lorenzer (1973) reformulates psychoanalysis as a materialist 
socialization theory. His concept starts from the level of drive development. According to 
Lorenzer, drive structures develop as inner reflections of the satisfying relationship between 
the child and its bodily needs (so-called ‘first nature’) on the one hand and the caregiver, 
representing socio-cultural practices, on the other hand. Lorenzer calls these reflections of real 
interactions specific interaction forms. They structure the expression of the infant’s bodily 
needs, that is, human inner nature only appears in socially mediated form. Without losing 
sight of the embodiedness of psychological processes, Lorenzer conceptualizes drive 
structures as social and historic factors.  
 
Specific interaction forms are related to linguistic and non-linguistic (e.g., pictorial) cultural 
symbols (Lorenzer, 1972, 1970b, 1984). It is only with these symbolization processes that 
consciousness and the unconscious are made possible – albeit in a historically specific social 
form. Lorenzer considers language to be more than an ensemble of words (Lorenzer, 1970a, 
1974). According to Lorenzer, language is conceptualized as “a unified whole of language 
use, life practices, and understanding of the world’ (Morgenroth, 2010a, p. 50). Social 
discourse infiltrates the child via symbolizations and (co)determines his or her consciousness. 
Socially tabooed interactions forms are deprived of consciousness by non- or de-
symbolization. This, however, does not always succeed entirely. Lorenzer continues from 
here with two ideas. First, the subject’s resistance is tied to the de-symbolized or that which is 
not yet symbolized and constitutes the dark side of social discourse. It is only by the 
conflictuous friction between individuals and discourse that subjectivity emerges (see 
Lorenzer, 1972). Second, Lorenzer accounts a particular relevance to ideologies in the 
socialization process (see Lorenzer, 1981). As linguistic and non-linguistic templates, 
                                                            
8 The works of Thomas Ziehe deserve mention but cannot be included here. Ziehe (1975) stipulated a debate 
with his concept of a new/narcissistic socialization type (NST), which drew on the classical concept of the social 
character on a self-psychological basis.  
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ideologies offer a symbolic framework for the recurrence of suppressed contents which cover 
up the de-symbolized and at the same time make it accessible to consciousness and to action, 
albeit dressed up in false symbols (re-symbolization). Ideologies literally lead to false 
consciousness and may replace clinical symptoms. This way, ideologies may even contribute 
to the prevention of pathologies.  
 
Even if Lorenzer’s approach has remained fragmented, it remains a productive re-
conceptualization of psychoanalytic social psychology which has sparked rather little 
attention until now. As Morgenroth explains, “His approach was considered as too hermetic« 
(Morgenroth, 2010a, p. 50; transl. NR) and remains sociologically ‘unsatisfying’”(König 
2000, p. 567; transl. NR) due to its lack of social theoretical reflections.  
 
Klaus Horn struggles to find a psychoanalytic answer to the question regarding the social 
significance of subjectivity (Horn, 1972, 1973). He analyzes remains of suffering and 
resistance within the subject under conditions of late bourgeois society. Both theoretically and 
content-wise, he mostly summarizes the insights gained by Mitscherlich and critical theory. 
He deepens these earlier reflections with the help of a theory of narcissism but hardly offers 
innovative results. Nevertheless, his methodical reflections on psychoanalytic social research 
are of vital significance. It was Horn who first devoted systematic attention to 
psychoanalytically oriented methods of data analysis and collection (‘scenic interview) 
(Horn/Beier/Wolf, 1983; Horn/Beier/Kraft-Krumm, 1984). 
 
Peter Brückner’s political psychology reaches way beyond the mere analysis of the subjective 
factor of social processes. Brückner radicalizes Mitscherlich’s strategy of reconstructing 
social encroachments in individual life histories by conceiving of political psychology as both 
a scientific and a political activity. The core idea is that there is a “relationship between the 
life histories of individuals and the historic harms they inflict on one another” (Brückner 
1968, p. 94; transl. NR). Brückner (1966) noted a concrete aspect of this general idea under 
the keyword pathology of obedience. On the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of culture and 
structure, he describes ego-ideal and super-ego as “bridgeheads within the interiority of the 
governed individuals,” thanks to which social authorities can rule (Brückner 1970, p. 19, see 
1968, p. 100; transl. NR). He conceptualizes the super-ego as a function that not only co-
determines the vicissitudes of the drive but can also suppress non-conformist perceptions of 
society and political reflective processes. S/he who has internalized too many social 
imperatives gets afraid when criticizing, doubting, thinking, and questioning normality.  
This insight forms one backbone of what is maybe the most careful analysis of the anti-
authoritarian current of the student protests of the 1960s; Brückner’s reflections on The 
Transformation of Democratic Consciousness (Brückner, 1970). With their anti-authoritarian 
protest, the students collectively engaged in a deconstruction of the inner ‘bridgeheads’ of 
authority. By projecting these (back) onto authority figures they perceived them as a part of 
reality that could be provoked and attacked. They produced social situations in which they 
could change their super-ego structures and, thus, their blocks in thought and their feelings of 
fear, helplessness, and shame, all this in the process of a social interaction with authority 
figures (see Brückner, 1970). Brückner is convinced, however, that this “organized self-
release’ (Brückner, 1970, p. 47; transl. NR) and the alteration of super-ego structures can only 
succeed within the context of political practice.
9
 
                                                            
9 Brückner showed solidarity with the protest movements of the 1960s and accompanied the movements of the 
1970s up until the RAF with critical reflections (see Brückner, 1973, 1976a and b, Brückner/Krovoza, 1972b). 
He did not want to legitimize but to understand them against the backdrop of the historical development of 
society. Official politicians as well as the university directorate of his home university in Hannover did not 
                                                     Critical Psychology in Changing World  433 
 
 
 
Brückner does not halt at these insights into the pathology of obedience but uses them to 
reflect on psychology and psychologists in a science critical manner (see Brückner, 1966; 
Brückner/Krovoza, 1972a). He concludes tha socially induced thought blocks can also be 
found in (political) psychologists (see Brückner, 1968). For this reason, political psychology 
can only gain valid insights into social reality “when it destroys its everyday occurrence by 
means of critique” (ibid., p. 94; transl. NR). “Political and psychological activity« (ibid. p. 95; 
transl. NR) is part of its method of knowledge; “it understands phenomena by trying to 
change them” (ibid., p. 95; transl. NR). This attempt to change society allows the researchers 
to experience that which cannot be thought of and to analyze when feelings of fear, shame, 
guilt, insufficiency, and helplessness occur. It is only the political and psychological reflection 
of this experience against the backdrop of its social basis that makes emancipative knowledge 
of social power structures possible. As he puts it, “Experiencing who we are and who really 
rules in society is part of the same process” (ibid., p. 98; transl. NR). Brückner’s 
methodological call for radical reflexivity aims at nothing less but the abolition of the 
“separation between ‘value-neutral’ scientist and ‘concerned’ person” (Krovoza/Schneider 
1988, p. 34; transl. NR). 
 
Regardless of the fact that Brückner’s hopes for a far-reaching social change remained 
unfulfilled, it can be noted that it was only in the course of its further development in the 
context of the protest movements that critical psychoanalytic social psychology gained a 
“reference point beyond theory and, as a consequence, a specific approach to its subject that 
mediates psychological and political thought. In this regard, this phase marks both the end and 
the new beginning of political psychology in Western Germany” (Krovoza/Schneider, 1988, 
p. 34; transl. NR).  
  
1.5. Ethno-psychoanalysis 
 
Ethno-psychoanalysis was developed in Zurich during the 1950s and 1960s and represents 
another attempt to link psychoanalysis and the critique of society. It was founded by Paul 
Parin and Goldy Parin-Matthèy – both emigrants from Slowenia/Austria – as well as Fritz 
Morgenthaler. All three of them were politically dedicated and leftist psychoanalysts who 
practiced in Zurich and had supported the resistance of Yugoslav partisans as physicians. For 
ethno-psychoanalysis, too, the experience of fascism and National Socialism was essential.  
 
Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler wondered whether the Freudian method was 
applicable to other societies than European-bourgeois society and conducted field work with 
the Dogon and Agni communities in West Africa. Thus, they tried to explore the 
interdependency of social and psychological factors in these societies. At that time, several 
attempts to link ethnology and psychoanalysis had been undertaken, among others, by 
psychoanalysts who conducted ethnological studies like Géza Roheim and proponents of the 
‘culture and personality’-school that had developed in the USA during the 1930s. However, it 
was Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler who first applied the psychoanalytic method as a 
field work method (see Reichmayr, 2003). In addition to analyzing socio-historic structures, 
they conducted intensive psychoanalytically inspired conversations with the Dogon and the 
Agni over a long period of time and put a special emphasis on the (transference) relationship 
between themselves and their respondents (see chapter 3). Zurich’s ethno-psychoanalysis 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
comprehend this difference between understanding and legitimating: In their eyes, Brückner had not distanced 
himself from the armed groups decidedly enough; he was suspended from his service as a lecturer and barred 
from university.  
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gained prominence due to the reception of its books by the student protest movement of 1968 
with which Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler sympathized. White People Think Too 
Much, a book about psychoanalytic studies with the Dogon from 1963, stimulated particular 
interest. Students who struggled with current social relations, with colonialism, and 
ethnocentrism were especially keen to learn about other forms of social life.  
 
Paul Parin, Goldy Parin-Matthèy, and Fritz Morgenthaler increasingly considered ethno-
psychoanalysis as a method to analyze the interpenetration of social power relations and 
mental powers in their own society within the framework of comparative critical social 
psychology. Ethno-psychoanalysis, so they hoped, would open up an understanding of both 
the mechanisms of power with their effects on the psyche of the dominated and the dominant, 
as well as political, social, and racial oppression. It is a special characteristic of the Zurich 
school of ethno-psychoanalysis that its members continuously bridged psychoanalytic 
research with clinical practice. In their view, psychoanalytic work that did not reflect on the 
meaning of social relations only added to the obscuration of reality. This nexus between 
psychoanalytic activity and critique of society is evident in various publications, among 
others, on psychoanalytic technique, on issues like sexuality and norm orientation, and on 
“medicocentrism” in psychotherapy (Parin/Parin-Matthèy, 1988).  
 
Parin and Morgenthaler furthermore played a central role in establishing a training institution 
for prospective psychotherapists which, during the 1960s and 1970s, brought forth a circle of 
leftist analysts who actively engaged in the 68 protests. Most significant in this regard was the 
so-called “Plattform”-movement founded as a cooperation of young psychoanalysts from 
different countries in 1969. The platform was committed to a leftist psychoanalysis, involving 
social engagement and international solidarity, and demanded the democratization of the 
hierarchical and elitist structure of psychoanalytic education (Burgermeister, 2008). A split 
between leftist and bourgeois analysts in 1977 gave way to the direct democratic Zurich 
Psychoanalytic Seminar (Psychoanalytisches Seminar Zürich; PSZ), the major training 
institute for psychoanalysis in Switzerland.  
 
Young analysts started to take up ethno-psychoanalytic approaches. Most popular are 
probably the ethnologists Maya Nadig and Mario Erdheim who conducted ethno-
psychoanalytic research in Switzerland and Central America and lectured at the Ethnological 
Seminar at the University of Zurich, at the University of Bremen, and at the University of 
Frankfurt. While Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler had mostly pursued their research 
activities outside the academic field, Nadig and Erdheim worked within the confines of 
academic institutions and critically dealt with the resulting contradictions in their writings. 
Taking up George Devereux’s 1976 book From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral 
Sciences, they called for integrating and making conscious both the subjectivity and 
emotionality of the researcher and transference/counter-transference processes in the research 
process. They harshly criticized science with its self-image of objectivity, which left little 
room for the subjective elements of research. In their field research, Nadig and Erdheim 
developed the idea that researchers needed to go through a process of “social death,” which 
they considered the precondition of fully immersing into social processes. Analogues to the 
training analysis of the psychoanalyst, this social death was supposed to restructure 
experience in such a way that “the role systems that sustain our identity and steer our 
perception are shattered by confrontation with the other” (Erdheim/Nadig, 1994, p. 72; transl. 
NR). Nadig and Erdheim deemed the confrontation with and analysis of colonial, gendered, 
and classed structures of inequality as well as one’s own delusions of grandeur and 
omnipotence as a most significant task of science. Their writings clearly express the ethno-
psychoanalytic objective to take an estranged view of one’s own society. Mario Erdheim is 
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most well-known for his book The Social Production of Unconsciousness (1984), in which he 
analyzed how the unconscious is produced in the course of the socio-historic process in order 
to stabilize relations of dominance in different ‘cultures.’ Erdheim broadened the scope of 
psychoanalytic culture theory, which until then had been focused on early childhood, to 
include theoretical reflections on the vital significance of adolescence for processes of cultural 
change and stability, and on the role played by initiations and institutions like school, youth 
clubs, or the military. Maya Nadig studied the social situation of women within the Zurich 
uplands and in Mexico, among others, and placed the relation between her and her 
interviewees at the core of here analyses (see Nadig, 1986). Pursuing her aim to combine 
critical ethnology, feminist social research, and psychoanalysis, she comes up against both an 
essentialist notion of culture and ethnicity and an a-historic and biologistic concept of sex and 
gender, and criticizes patriarchal psychoanalytic traditions (Nadig, 1994). Her first critical 
impulse is especially necessary in ethno-psychoanalysis, because, despite all claims to do 
aways with categories such as ‘other’ and ‘self,’ many writings that were produced before the 
1990s still exert pressures for an essentialist understanding of culture.  
In addition to Erdheim and Nadig, many other (younger) analysts in the context of the Zurich 
Psychoanalytic Seminar put forth the linkage of psychoanalysis and socio-critique by 
conducting their own ethno-psychoanalytic research and by focusing on subjects like 
feminism, fascism, racism, and migration (see Morgenthaler/Weiss/Morgenthaler, 1984; Roth 
1994; Modena, 2002; Bazzi, et al. 2000; Ninck Gbeassor, et al. 1999; Pedrina, et al. 1999).  
 
2. Research foci 
 
2.1. Authoritarianism and right-wing extremism 
 
The analysis of authoritarianism has a central place in the history of psychoanalytic social 
psychology because it paved the way for the development of its empirical orientation. It is due 
to early psychoanalytic research on authoritarianism that the entire field of social research 
culminated in seminal studies that are still relevant today. 
The incipient stages of research on authoritarianism date back to the writings of Reich and 
Fromm in the beginning of the 1930s (see chapter 1.2. and 1.3.). Fromm had discovered a 
certain and widely common “sado-masochist character structure” that he deemed the result of 
a patriarchal family with a father who tries to restore his authority, which has been 
delegitimized by his actual social powerlessness, by authoritarian behavior. The tormented 
children submit to the father, develop a rigid and punitive super-ego, and project their massive 
aggressions, once directed at the father, at outer enemies (see chapter 2.2.). This concept 
offered Fromm an explanation for the wide support for National Socialism among the German 
population and for the susceptibility of German workers to it. Already in 1929/30, Fromm and 
his colleagues had conducted a survey among workers, which had analyzed political and 
social attitudes as well as the distribution of certain social characters among workers, for the 
IfS (Fromm 1931/1980). The study was not published until the 1980s in English and German. 
It provided the basis for all research projects to follow in this field and, in addition to the 
scientific value of the insights gained, its highly distressing results served as a warning signal 
for the members of the institute, revealing how low the workers’ readiness for resistance 
against National Socialism actually was (the IfS started developing exile plans soon after). In 
1936, the IfS authored the Studies on Authority and Family (Horkheimer, 1936), which were 
designed as both theoretical and empirical studies, were still written in Germany, and took up 
Fromm’s concept of the social character. 
 
The major work Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, et al. 1950) was produced in two 
volumes in exile. It is the core of the research project “Studies in Prejudice” conducted by the 
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IfS together with American social scientists from the middle until the end of the 1940s. The 
Studies in Prejudice were commissioned by the American Jewish Committee and their aim 
was to explore how susceptible to fascism Americans were in the face of the Second World 
War (see Wiggershaus, 1988). Horkheimer, then director of the IfS, praised the “combination 
of European ideas and American methods” (ibid. p. 456; transl. NR) used by the research 
team. On the basis of questionnaires and interviews, the authors developed a typology of 
different character and personality structures and analyzed them with regard to political and 
social attitudes, unconscious conflicts, desires, and fears. The scientists thought of character 
as a “determinant of ideological preferences” (Adorno, et al. 1950, p. 5) which was regarded 
as rather firm but not final, and the types ranged from an anti-democratic authoritarian, highly 
biased syndrome to a “genuine liberal” unbiased type. The F(ascism)-scale designed to gather 
the relevant data on types contained nine variables: conventionalism, authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and 
“toughness,” destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. According to the research 
group around Adorno, the variables complemented each other in such a way as to “form a 
single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive to 
antidemocratic propaganda” (ibid. p. 228). Following Horkheimer, the autoritarian or sado-
masochist character “can be observed throughout the entire history of bourgeois society,” but 
now stands “symptomatically for a world that adheres to family authority even after the inner 
substance of the family has dissolved” (Horkheimer, 1960, p. 281; transl. NR). In other 
words, bourgeois family, with its patriarchal and unquestioned authority figure at its core, is 
already eroded, and now the father represents a “weak” figure. 
 
The research group focused on anti-Semitic attitudes which appeared in everyday life and 
which they called “prejudices.” After their return from exile, the scientists of the IfS 
conducted a large-scale group experiment (Pollock, 1955) (see chapter 2.3.), in addition to 
several smaller studies on anti-Semitism and authoritarianism. Today, the study on 
authoritarianism is counted among the classics of research on prejudice and authoritarianism. 
Studies on right-wing extremism often referred and still refer to this study directly or try to 
apply it in a modified version. Others have criticized the concept of character as static and for 
its neglect of later – and earlier – influences (e.g., in adolescence) and of “situative constraints 
and life contexts” (see Wacker, 1979, p. 105 ff. who refers to the Stanford and Milgram 
experiments; transl. NR). 
 
The concept of authoritarianism was taken up by Christel Hopf (1995), who criticizes Adorno 
et al. for overemphasizing the traditional father figure and the Oedipus conflict. Hopf, by 
contrast, accords more significance to the mother within the family and stresses that 
problematic and uncertain attachment experiences as well as pre-Oedipal relations between 
the child and the mother or another significant person are important factors in the 
development of authoritarian character structures. She propounds the thesis that authoritarian 
submissiveness has given way to authoritarian aggression towards strangers (at the beginning 
of the 1990s). Hopf emphasizes the significance of specific socialization experiences that may 
change the course of development in another direction. Thus, her concept is more “open’ but 
mainly focuses on real inner-family relations and does not aim at social theory. Gerda Lederer 
conducted her own surveys with only minimally changed scales. In a comparative study in 
East and West Germany after the reunification, she showed that adolescents who had grown 
up in East Germany exerted a less “closed” syndrome with correlating variables (see Lederer, 
1995). Lederer emphasizes the dialectic of autoritarian submission and aggression that exists 
in aggressive personalities. 
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Detlef Oesterreich distances himself from the classical concept and from the two authors 
mentioned above. Instead, he speaks of an “authoritarian reaction” which not only functions 
as an adaption to authoritarian conditions but also expresses a search for protection and 
security, thus resulting in a situational submission due to fear and uncertainty. Oesterreich 
focuses on the situational conduct of individuals. He starts from the assumption that the 
causes of authoritarian attitudes have to do with excessive demands on children who then 
cling to images of their parents that promise security and become utterly dependent. 
Oesterreich, too, conducted a comparative study on authoritarianism in adolescents in East 
and West Germany (Oesterreich, 1993). According to him, political situations in a state of 
crisis can trigger authoritarian reactions, causing an increasing orientation towards right-wing 
extremist groups. Oesterreich, however, reveals a reductionism that is at the same time 
sociologistic and a-historic in thinking that a political system change causes insecurity and 
“identity crises” and produces adolescents who are, because of their fixation on security, 
especially vulnerable to commit racist arson and other attacks against migrants, as happened 
in East (and West) Germany in the early 1990s. 
 
For Manfred Clemenz, the traditional concept of authoritarian personality mitigates the role of 
narcissism and pre-Oedipal experiences. Following authors such as Adorno (1955a), but also 
Bohleber, Brede, Heim, and Overbeck, he considers the combination of perspectives on both 
Oedipality and narcissism as particularly useful for the study of right-wing personality 
structures (see Clemenz, 1998). For example, Karola Brede has suggested the concept of the 
“new authoritarian” who is characterized by features like self-referentiality, ambiguity 
intolerance, defense against the experience of failure by narcissistic delusions of grandeur, 
narcissistic delusions of merging with superiors, etc., which, according to Clemenz, can be 
considered as the “psychological correlates of the economically and technologically induced 
process of modernity” (Clemenz, 1998, p. 148; transl. NR). Clemenz, however, cautions 
against pathologizing the individual and argues in favor of a multi-dimensional model, a 
“biographically oriented reconstruction of the entire cascaded process of meditation” (ibid. p. 
158; transl. NR). Right-wing extremism thus becomes a paradigmatic application of 
psychoanalytic social psychology. 
 
Klaus Ottomeyer advocates a perspective that considers situational conditions, for example 
the unsettling effects of anomaly, in addition to psychoanalytic developmental psychology. 
Together with right-wing or populist offers that fuel fear and intensify existing sentiments, he 
combines the above two factors into a triad of authoritarianism or right-wing extremism (see 
Menschik-Bendele, 1998). Adolescence, in particular, is marked by drive conflicts and 
identity conflicts that trigger fear and doubt and may disturb the development of identity. 
“Escaping” into right-wing extremism may seem as a way out then. Ottomeyer emphasizes, 
however, that ruptures in ego-identity can occur also in adults of all ages and make them 
vulnerable to right-wing extremist offerings. 
 
It is interesting that the concept of group focused enmity, which was developed in a long-term 
study by a team lead by sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer and has become rather popular over 
the last ten years, is considered as a syndrome of characteristics or tendencies which show 
considerable overlap with the traditional concept of the authoritarian character and its F-scale 
(see Heitmeyer, 2002). This approach contains a broad notion of exclusions, attitudes, and 
everyday practices (e.g. sexism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, homophobia, a hostile attitude 
towards muslims, disabled, permanently unemployed or towards homeless people) but is 
(mainly) reduced to processes of deprivation, while inner-family socialization and conflicts 
(as well as their social mediation) are not included (contrary to classical studies on 
authoritarianism). 
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Overall, discussions on authoritarianism have been mostly focused on “situation versus 
character” debates and on the validity of items. Arguments concerning the limits of the 
concept, its “obsolescence” (Marcuse), and its “patricentric and Oedipal bias” (Clemenz; 
transl. NR) have gained some momentum in the last years, however they seem to have 
receded already. Which concept of social character coincides with today’s late capitalist 
society, and whether subjectivity can be understood this way at all are questions that must 
become the subject of discussion, debate and reflection while keeping the now traditional 
notions in mind. 
 
2.2. Inclusion and exclusion 
 
In the face of the National Socialist mass movement and its rampant anti-Semitism at the 
latest, critical social psychologists put considerations of the dynamics of masses and the 
constitution of in-groups, out-groups, and enemy-groups at the forefront of their reflections. 
At the beginning, analyses of nationalism and anti-Semitism focused on authoritarian 
attachments that developed within the family and on their respective prejudice structures 
(Fromm, 1931; Adorno et al., 1950; see chapter 2.1.), but soon processes of 
communitarization took on a pivotal position in the research agenda. It was not the single 
individual and its character structure, produced within family relations, but the 
interpenetration of individual conflicts, political propaganda, and mass dynamics that was at 
the heart of analysis. Taking up Freud’s mass psychology (Freud, 1921), critical social 
psychologists asked how nationalist, in particular the National Socialist, mass (movements) 
worked What made them so attractive for individuals? What kept the mass together, and 
which emotional attachments and dynamics played a part in it? Even more so than Freud, the 
authors focused on processes of the formation of the concept of enemy, especially anti-
Semitism, because they realized that nationalism and racism/xenophobia/anti-Semitism could 
only be understood in combination, as complementary processes. The process of building an 
in-group or an out-group functions like a paranoid delusion on the level of mass psychology.  
 
Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) does not live up to its title but is based on 
reflections on social character rather than an analysis of mass dynamics themselves. However, 
Reich is ahead of the later mass psychological approaches in his attempt to historicize and 
contextualize the subjects of the mass within a Marxist class analysis that locates the specific 
fears and desires that were susceptible to National Socialist propaganda.  
In 1951, Adorno wrote one of the most interesting mass psychological texts, Freudian Theory 
and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda. He showed how accurately and intuitively Freud had 
anticipated the structure and dynamic of the National Socialist Movement. Alexander and 
Margarete Mitscherlich took up this analysis in their book The Inability to Mourn (1967). 
National Socialism offered the lower middle class, tormented by the fear of losing its 
economic and social position, the possibility of compensating narcissistic wounds by 
imaginary participation in the “collective narcissism” (Adorno) of the German 
‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (folk community) kept together by the ‘Führer.’ Fascist propaganda has 
a structuring function in this regard; it seizes existing fears, intensifies them, canalizes the 
germinating melting desires and aggressions on the basis of already existing ideas of 
nationhood and resentments, and presents a leader who is supposedly going to save the world 
from its alleged downfall (see Adorno, 1943/2000, 1951; Löwenthal/Gutermann, 1949).  
 
Taking up these reflections, though not in relation to National Socialism, fundamental 
reflections on the ego-stabilizing function of nationalisms were to follow. Vamik D. Volkan’s 
analyses of large group processes acquired vogue also in the German speaking countries. 
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Volkan differentiates the different aspects mentioned in Freudian mass psychology but 
essentializes the analyzed large groups (Volkan, 1988, 1997). Jan Lohl (2010) deepens one 
aspect of Volkan’s approach against the backdrop of research on nationalism (Anderson, 
Gellner, Hobsbawm) and speaks of a “national containment” which is loaded with narcissism 
by national symbols. Özdogan (2007), too, taking up Lorenzer’s symbol and interaction 
theory, emphasizes the significance of national symbols (architecture, flags, historical 
narratives) for the nationalization of subjects in the course of socialization.  
 
In his conception of war as a “psychosocial arrangement” between the interests of the social 
elites and the narcissistic needs of the mass which stabilizes power relations, Mentzos (1992, 
1993) conceptualizes the identification with a national “grandiose self” as a symptom of a 
“pseudo-coping” with inner conflicts. Bohleber (1992) puts particular emphasis on the desires 
for merging, wholeness, and integrity that cling to an organic image of the nation connected 
with images of the family. The nation is so interlocked with images of purity that it is 
desperately in need of the ‘other.’ Everything that appears as ‘impure’ or as a threat is then 
projected onto the ‘other,’ who is imagined as a filthy alien element that supposedly has to be 
cleared of (see Bohleber, 1994; Heim, 1992; Springer, 1999).  
 
Anti-Semitism was conceptualized as a negative mechanism of communitarization rather 
early on. Social fears, which increase by economic crises, and which bring to the fore inner 
psychological conflicts, are discharged in the form of aggressions. The image of a 
homogenous in-group – a fantasy that covers up existing power and ruling relations – can 
only emerge when aggressions that are in fact directed against the authoritarian leader, the 
ruling classes, or the competing members of one’s group, are turned against certain social 
groups that are excluded from the community. With the chosen enemy, repressed aggressive 
tendencies, tabooed sexual desires, and critical objections by ego and super-ego can be fought 
against, as can be the fears of guilt produced by aggressions against social elites and one’s 
own ‘fellow folks.’ These projections lead to a paranoid attitude, as the members of the 
‘outgroup’ are ascribed properties that are eliminated in one’s own self, they are perceived as 
a constant threat and, due to the projected aggressions, as perpetrators and haunters that need 
to be fended off, kept down, or destroyed altogether. The projected aggressions can thus be 
realized as an alleged ‘act of self-defense’ (Pohl, 2006). Because of this dynamic, Simmel 
(1946) called anti-Semitism a “mass psychosis” the function of which had been described by 
Waelder (1935; see also 1946) at an earlier point. Simmel’s text derives from the Psychiatric 
Symposion on Anti-Semitism, which he had organized in San Francisco in 1944, in which 
Adorno, Fenichel, and Horkheimer participated as well, and which witnessed the most 
advanced analyses of the psychology of anti-Semitism of the time (see Simmel, 1946). At a 
symposium about the psychological and social conditions of anti-Semitism organized by 
Mitscherlich in 1962, Wangh (1962) emphasized the significance of a detailed historical 
perspective for the analysis of NS-anti-Semitism. Lorenzer (1981) conceptualized nationalist 
and anti-Semitic ideologies as ‘templates’ with the ability to sew together current and older 
psychological conflicts in a process of afterwardness.  
 
Similar dynamics, but different auguries, marked anti-Semitism after Auschwitz, so-called 
‘secondary anti-Semitism’ (Schönbach, 1960) in post National Socialist German nations (see 
chapter 2.3.). After the mass murder of Jews, anti-Semitic resentments had to take on a new 
and more hidden form of appearance while, at the same time, they gained a new motivation. 
Jews, being the main victims of National Socialism, reminded many Germans of the 
horrendous crimes of the German nation. In order to restitute their “collective narcissism,” 
they avert these memories. Again and still, the nation supposedly must be cleared from 
‘Jewish elements,’ mostly by means of projecting guilt and by relativizing victim-perpetrator 
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relations (see Adorno 1955b). This act of ‘clearance’ can take on different and changing 
forms (Adorno, 1955b; Claussen, 1987a; Rommelspacher, 1995; Rensmann, 1998; Schönbach 
1961). Analyzing these new forms of anti-Semitism and against the backdrop of 
psychoanalytic social psychological reflections, a form of ‘left-wing anti-Semitism’ (Keilson 
1988), manifest in a fundamental rejection of the state Israel after the Six-Day-War, entered 
the discussion (see Kloke, 1994; Rensmann, 2004, pp. 296-320; Postone, 2005), which led to 
major splits within the German left at the beginning of the new millennium. Quindeau (2007, 
2008a) has recently propounded the thesis that, going along with the dying out of the 
perpetrator generation, the anti-Semitism which acted primarily as a defense against guilt has 
changed into an anti-Semitism that serves to relieve from guilt. As a compensation for their 
alleged acknowledgement of German responsibility for the Holocaust, the descendants of the 
perpetrators search everywhere, but especially in the Arabic countries, for even worse anti-
Semites, completely ignore the anti-Semitism of the German majority population, and act as 
newly reformed missionaries against anti-Semitism. Taking up these reflections, Stender 
(2011) has shown how racist, anti-Semitic, and current anti-Muslim discourses are interlocked 
into a complex web of inclusion and exclusion in the German immigration nation.  
 
It must be emphasized that mass psychological analyses can explain neither nationalism nor 
National Socialism or anti-Semitism in its basic dynamics. Such a claim would amount to a 
psychologistic reduction. Mass psychological reflections only make sense within the 
framework of social theory. As Horkheimer and Adorno in The Elements of Anti-Semitism 
(1944), and later authors such as Postone (1979) and Claussen (1987a,b), have emphasized, 
anti-Semitism must be considered as an ideological basic motif of (late) capitalism. Jews are 
perceived as the personifications of the abstract side of capitalist exchange of goods, and thus 
as representations of the circulation sphere, i.e., the world of trades and finances that is 
targeted by a kind of fetishistic critique of capitalism in times of crisis. The enemy, thus 
determined, may secondarily serve as a template for a crooked cure of other (inner 
psychological) conflicts of the subjects. Only against the backdrop of this definition of anti-
Semitism as a basic element of bourgeois society it becomes evident that critical social 
psychological studies on anti-Semitism not only aim at reducing prejudices, but 
concomitantly aim to bring forth, a fundamental critique of society (see for an overview of 
research on anti-Semitism within critical theory Rensmann, 1998).  
 
The same holds for the analysis of racism, which must be discussed within the context of 
capitalist societies that are structure by the logic of the nation state and by (post)colonial 
relations (see e.g., Balibar/Wallerstein, 1991). There is a difference between racist and anti-
Semitic enemy constructions. While Jews are constructed as representations of capitalist real 
abstractions and thus connected with fantasies of intellectuality and omnipotence, racism 
fantasizes about the inferiority and closeness to nature of the ‘other.’
10
 
Because of the specific historical conditions of psychoanalytic social psychology, and in 
consequence of the Shoah, analyses of anti-Semitism have always taken a central position 
within psychoanalytic social psychological theory building. Studies on (post)colonial racism 
have been rather neglected or have merely accompanied the analysis of racist anti-Semitism. 
It was only after the xenophobic attacks on asylum-homes that occurred after the German 
‘reunification’ in the early 1990s that researchers started to devote attention to the relation of 
racist attacks and (male) adolescence (see Nadig, 1993, 2001; Streeck-Fischer, 1993), taking 
up Erdheim’s (1985, 1987) reflections on xenophobia. Erdheim had called attention to the 
                                                            
10 Anti-Semitism combines both tendencies: Fenichel (1946) already emphasized that Jews served the anti-
Semitist as a projection surface for both super-ego as well as Id tendencies and are thus imagined as both 
omnipotent and ›subhuman‹. 
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dynamics of afterwardness of the ‘representation of the other’ which develops early in life, is 
constantly re-written as an image of the exterior of the primary object, the family, and one’s 
‘own culture’ that is both seducing and threatening, and is formed and connoted anew in 
adolescence. Xenophobia as well as its counter-piece, exoticism, helps to circumvent the 
confrontational disengagement from the family. Pohl (2003) and Nadig (2001) show that 
xenophobia – like anti-Semitism (see Winter, 2011a) – has its affective roots in gendered 
conflict structures, and that male xenophobia and gynophobia often accompany each other. 
Nadig (1993) furthermore points to the complex interlocking of individual psychological, 
peer-group specific, social, and economic processes in the development of adolescent 
violence.  
Recently, social psychologists have asked whether the anti-Muslim resentments that flared up 
after 9/11 present a new phenomenon next to (cultural) racism and anti-Semitism (see 
Follert/Özdogan, 2011). To us, this debate, like the one about the interpenetration, overlaps, 
and aperiodicities of different forms of racism and anti-Semitism, seems pivotal for a 
contextualized analysis of current resentments in Western countries.  
 
2.3. National Socialism and Its Consequences 
 
In view of the fact that the vast majority of Germans identified with National Socialism, its 
nationalistic goals, and its anti-Semitic politics between 1933 and 1945, psychoanalytic social 
psychology after the NS-regime turned its attention to the constitution of the mental 
substructure of a German post-war society that thought of itself as democratic. This is of 
particular importance, because there is an asynchrony of social change that has already been 
stressed by Freud (1933). When a dictatorship transforms into a democracy, the re-
constitution of political institutions as well as legal reforms can be realized rather quickly. It 
takes much longer to achieve a change in the subjective dimension of the political, in implicit 
patterns of orientation, affects structures, libidinous attachments, identifications, and enemy 
constructions. Changing this dimension could only be attempted by a generation change 
(Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967). For a critical social psychology, it is of utmost significance to 
ask about the (cross-generational) “existence of National Socialism within democracy” 
(Adorno, 1959, p. 115). 
 
The results of the empirical study Group Experiment (Pollock, 1955), conducted by Adorno 
and Horkheimer, showed an unsettling, and oftentimes unabated continuity of National 
Socialist ideological fragments, anti-Semitic and anti-communist world views, and an 
affective national cohesiveness during the 1950s. Nonetheless, anti-Semitic attitudes had 
changed after the mass murder. As Rommelspacher notes, “At the core of secondary anti-
Semitism is the wish to forget the atrocities of National Socialism and to do away with all 
emotions connected to it” (Rommelspacher, 1995, p. 42; transl. NR). This secondary anti-
Semitism (Schönbach, 1961; see chapter 2.2.) brings about traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes 
with a new livery and envies Jews “their negative chosenness” (Diner, 2002, p. 234; transl. 
NR), their innocence for the crimes committed to them, which is perceived as a latent 
accusation by many Germans. According to this scheme, “it was not the SS people who were 
brutal, who tortured the Jews, but the Jews who supposedly forced the Germans to 
acknowledge the crimes of the SS” (Adorno, 1955b, p. 124). 
 
According to Adorno, secondary anti-Semitism is closely interrelated to the consequences of 
National Socialist communitarization, identifications with Hitler, the mass leader, and with 
the collective phantasm of ‘folk community’ were not destroyed (Adorno, 1959). They lurk 
within many individuals and wait for a renewed expression of an objectively reconstructed 
German nation, with historical impact, that is in line with reality. Adorno conceives of the 
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unconscious persistence of National Socialist identity constructs within the context of the 
economic constitution of (West) German post-war society. From the perspective of critical 
theory, societies based on a capitalist mode of production produce angst and feelings of 
powerlessness that are continuously dealt with by their members by affectively submitting to 
the socially offered form of the nation and by internalizing concepts of an enemy (see 
chapters 2.1. and 2.2.). How one’s own history is dealt with specifically must be understood 
against this general background. “The fact that fascism lives on, that the work of reprocessing 
the Past has not yet succeeded and has instead degenerated into its distorted image — empty, 
cold, forgetting – is the result of the continued existence of the same objective conditions that 
brought fascism in the first place” (ibid., p. 124). Attempts to protect collective narcissism by 
warding off history as well as secondary anti-Semitism come down to an effort to continue 
dealing with socially produced feelings of powerlessness and fear by national identifications 
and anti-Semitic concepts of the enemy (see Adorno, 1955). The past can only be accounted 
for by fundamentally changing the social conditions of the past.
11
 Claussen (1987) has shown 
what ‘remembering Auschwitz’ means in this regard; Without an understanding of the social 
conditions and relations of bourgeois society of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, where 
modern anti-Semitism is rooted, the remembrance of National Socialist mass murder remains 
incomplete.  
 
Despite his remarkable insights into the consequences of National Socialism, Adorno’s social 
psychological reflections are rather general when it comes to subject theory. It was Alexander 
and Margarete Mitscherlich who started to fill this deficit during the 1960s, without, however, 
referring to Adorno. In The Inability to Mourn (1967), they analyzed the consequences of 
Hitler’s death as mass leader that so many Germans were attached to by submissive 
narcissistic love. “Indeed, the loss of an object invested with such libidinous energy would 
have been a reason for melancholia” (Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967, p. 37; transl. NR). The 
Mitscherlichs think of melancholia (a depressive breakdown) as a specific kind of mourning 
that would have slowly resolved the emotional attachment to Hitler. However, according to 
their working hypothesis, the Germans did not lapse into melancholy because they de-realized 
their past. In this process, one’s own history is denied and turned into something other that 
seems to have nothing to do with one’s own (collective) identity – it “sinks, oneirically,” into 
proverbial silence (ibid. p. 40; transl. NR).  
 
The Mitscherlichs’ work has been controversially discussed for over forty years now, an 
astonishing time span for a book offering a commentary on its era (see for recent discussions 
Brockhaus 2008, Jureitz/Schneider 2011; see also the critique of Lübbe 1983, 1989 and Moser 
1992 as well as the responses in Dahmer/Rosenkötter, 1983, Perels 1999, and Schneider 
1993). In particular, the trauma theoretical re-readings of the inability to mourn by Bohleber 
(2001) and Krovoza (2005), who both focus on the Germans’ experience of violence during 
and after the war, deserve mention. By concentrating on the relation between mourning and 
trauma, these approaches bring an important dimension to accounting for the past into view. 
However, they are rather vague when it comes to a historically and subject theoretically exact 
definition of this relation (see for a critique Lohl 2006; Brunner, 2011a). For many Germans, 
the “horrors that the population experienced in the later years of the war” are “ran together 
into a single picture of unarticulated terror” (Adorno, 1955b, p. 138) together with the NS 
atrocities. The claims that Germans were traumatized by the allied aerial attacks on German 
                                                            
11 According to Adorno, the possibilities of such fundamental social change are restricted in post National 
Socialist times, and so the repetition of Auschwitz can only be counteracted from the side of the subjects (see 
Adorno 1967, p. 192f.). Against this background, Adorno sketched his concept of a democratic education 
(1962b, 1967).  
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cities, by the expulsion of Germans, by war captivity, by rapes, and by war childhood have 
sparked much public and psychoanalytic echo.  
 
Furthermore, there are publications that bring together the Mitscherlichs’ approach with 
Adorno’s empirical results and develop them further by means of more recent subject theories 
(Lohl, 2010; Brunner, 2011a). It must also be mentioned that Mihr (2007) has demonstrated 
the richness of the Mitscherlichs’ approach by means of a critical analysis of a current 
historic-political debate. The recent German victimization discourse that foregrounds German 
victims at the expense of the Germans’ victims. The persistence of the “post-fascist 
syndrome” (Brückner, quoted after Krovoza/Schneider 1989, p. 16f.; transl. NR) is owed to 
its existence within the alleged a-political sphere of the private, within the family. The 
particular significance of this sphere for intergenerational consequences of National Socialism 
has first been analyzed with children of Jewish victims of National Socialism (with the center 
of research being outside Western Germany). When they entered psychoanalytic treatment, 
they suffered from symptoms that would have been expected in people who had experienced 
the atrocities and inhumanity of the persecution by the Nazis first-hand. The traumas caused 
by persecution and in the camps, which were often aggravated by the lack of social 
acknowledgement in West Germany (Eissler, 1963; Kestenberg, 1982), infiltrated the lives of 
the later-born generations and took full psychological effects there (see 
Bergmann/Jucovy/Kestenberg, 1982; Kogan, 1995; see for the psychological and social 
situation of survivors and their descendants in West Germany Grünberg, 2000). 
 
After the pioneering works by Jokl (1968), Rosenkötter (1979), and Simenauer (1978), 
increasing evidence for the intergenerational effects of National Socialism has been gathered 
since the 1990s also with children and grandchildren of NS-perpetrators and followers. The 
effect of a submissive relation between parents and Hitler as the National Socialist mass 
leader on the constitution of the children’s ego-ideal and super-ego has been established 
(Rosenkötter, 1979, 1981, Simenauer, 1978, 1982) as have the intergenerational effects of 
socialization processes in Nazi Germany across three generations 
(Schneider/Stillke/Leinsweber, 1996). Brockhaus shows that and how the fascination with the 
National Socialist experiential offers – “the desire for unconditionality, the turning away from 
the dependencies and restrictions of everyday reality, and the idealization of self-conquest and 
sacrifice” (Brockhaus, 1997, p. 311; transl. NR) – unfolds an intergenerational dynamic. A 
couple of works have reconstructed the development of National Socialist emotional heritage 
within the generation of children, and even grandchildren, of NS-perpetrators and followers 
and have highlighted the significance of destructivity as well as guilt and its defense within 
the intergenerational process (see Bohleber, 1998; Buchholz, 1990; Eckstaedt, 1989; Lohl 
2010; Müller-Hohagen, 1994; Rothe, 2009). Research also focuses on family dialogues about 
Nazi Germany (Bar-On, 1989; Rosenthal 1997), showing that the very parts of the parents’ or 
grandparents’ histories that are not narrated have an even greater effect on later-born 
generations than a family-historic narrative.
12
  
 
Publications that inquire the different political significance of the intergenerational 
transmission of National Socialism and the relevance of unconscious contents for concrete 
                                                            
12 The intergenerational consequences of National Socialism in families of survivors on the one hand and in 
families of former perpetrators on the other hand were already compared in the book Generations of the 
Holocaust by Bergmann/Jucovy/Kestenberg (1982). Such comparisons have often led to problematic 
parallelisms between the destiny of the survivors’ and the perpetrators’ descendants. They all too often neglect 
differences and must be understood within the context of post-NS defense against guilt that has experienced an 
upheaval by recent debates about German war traumas. They have sparked criticism and efforts of differentiation 
(see Grünberg, 1997, 2002; Brunner, 2011b).  
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everyday actions deserve special emphasis. On the one hand, research has established that 
neither the severe National Socialist, anti-Semitic, and racist attitudes within the German 
majority population (Decker et al., 2008) nor the readiness to resort to violence of right-wing 
extremism among the National Socialists’ grandchildren can be understood without taking 
into account the aftermaths of National Socialism (see Bohleber, 1994; Ebrecht 2003; Lohl 
2010). Right-wing adolescents act out National Socialist emotional heritage in a specific way 
and think and place themselves back to the history of their grandparents, performing it in their 
current social reality (see Lohl, 2010). On the other hand, scientific inquiry has also shown 
that the “dynamic of the protest movement marked by the key year ‘1968’ needs to be 
contextualized within the aftermath of National Socialism (Schneider/Stillke/Leineweber 
2000; Lohl, 2011; Winter, 2011b). The accusations against the parent generation are a first 
ambivalent step on the way to account for National Socialism in a progressive manner and to 
‘spit out’ the National Socialist emotional heritage (see Lohl, 2009).  
For a critical psychoanalytic social psychology, wha is most remarkable about the 
(intergenerational) consequences of National Socialism is that despite changes in the political 
regime, the establishment of a constitutional state, and the integration with the West in the 
course of which democratic values were adopted, certain attitudes, affect dispositions, 
National Socialist identifications and propensities for projections have not only outlasted the 
‘zero hour’ but also continue to have effects across generations and to influence the feelings, 
actions, and thoughts of the later-borns in different ways. By employing an 
intergenerationally extended notion of the subject, critical social psychology can (informed by 
Benjamin’s theses on the notion of history) reveal the unconscious flow of history and make 
cogent that the past is an effective part of the present (also) within subjects.  
 
2.4. Subjectivity and gender 
 
According to Adorno, “an analytic social psychology needs to reveal social forces within the 
innermost mechanisms of the individual” (Adorno, 1952, p. 27; transl. NR). Genuinely 
subject theoretical reflections, asking how society ‘enters’ the innermost parts of the subject 
or how the subject is constituted by specific historical conditions, build an integral part of the 
fundament of psychoanalytic social psychology. Freud’s questions in this regard are bold or 
downright scandalous, they are “avant-garde and provocative in their presuppositionlessness” 
(Gast, 1996, p. 101; transl. NR). From his radically subject-centered position he not only 
inquires into the development of the ego and bourgeois self-awareness, he deconstructs them 
as chimeras of a subject split in itself, but also interrogates the ontogenetic conditions of 
subjectivity, the conditions of the differentiation between inner and outer reality, subject and 
object, past, presence, and future. The meta-psychological encircling of notions like desire, 
fantasy, drive, sexuality, unconscious, body, reality, afterwardness, etc., is a central part of 
critical psychoanalytic social psychology as are the implicit and explicit meta-reflections on 
the subject matter, the logic, and the ‘truth’ of psychoanalytic knowledge. Debates on the 
development of gender identity are located within this grappling with the constitution of 
subjectivity, which has always given way to a clash between essentialist and constructivist 
perspectives and thus has always tackled the historicity of Freud’s insights.  
 
Freud’s psychoanalysis causes controversies in critical gender studies up until today. Some 
authors praise Freud’s perspective on gender dualism as virtually constructivist while others 
condemn his teachings as a psychological legitimation and essentialization of bourgeois 
gender relations at the end of the nineteenth century. What is it with psychoanalytic subject 
theory that brings about such different evaluations of its (counter-) emancipative potential? 
Freud has described human drive structure as bisexual. Libido thus unites the contradictory 
features (e.g., active and passive orientation of sexuality) that are separated in bourgeois 
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society and constructed as either male or female (Freud, 1933). Only seemingly in contrast to 
this bisexuality-thesis of desire, Freud propounds the view that the “ pass through the early 
phases of libidinal development in the same manner” (ibid., p. 117), but that the psycho-
sexuality of girls until the beginning of the Oedipal stage exerts a “wholly masculine 
character” (Freud 1905b, p. 219), that is, that the girl is but a “little man’ and that the pre-
Oedipal experience of infants only has one sex, the male one (key word: ‘phallic monism’). 
Freud understands the “male’ as general and primordial on the one hand, and as another side 
of sexuality on the other hand (Löchel, 1990).  
 
Freud interpreted the gendered specificity of subjectivity as a conflictuous mental coping with 
the “knowledge” of anatomical difference which follows the bisexual/phallic monist phase 
and is not biologically determined (Freud, 1933). However, the anatomical difference in its 
binary form was a fundamental given for Freud: “penis” vs. “no penis.” He thus considered 
the psychological development of girls, in stark contrast to the development of boys, as 
characterized by the coping with deficiency and by the resulting “penis envy.” It supposedly 
was this penis envy that urged girls to heterosexually desire the phallus.  
 
The contradictions in Freud’s concept of bisexuality versus phallic monism, which mirrors the 
androcentrism of the ideology of sex (human = man), and the biologistic interpretation of 
Freud’s notion of drives have repeatedly sparked feminist criticism, while his deconstruction 
of the “nature” of sex by reconstructing its psychosexual development has offered the starting 
point for an emancipative subversion of gender relations.  
 
Freud’s views were harshly criticized already in the 1920s. Karen Horney, for example, 
insisted that “femininity” did not result from deficiency, i.e., from the absence of a penis. 
According to Horney, this view was the result of male presumptuousness. On a theoretical 
level, she blames Freud for having neglected biology. She sketches a model in which human 
nature, in principle developing femininity and masculinity along strictly parallel lines, was 
“repressed” by patriarchal education in late childhood (this model was targeted by Adorno 
when he criticized Horney’s sociologism and biologism; compare chapter 1.3.). She thus 
regarded female heterosexuality as an innate disposition rather than the result of “penis envy” 
(Horney, 1926).  
 
When the National Socialists rose to power at the beginning of the 1930s, this controversial 
debate was disrupted and was not pursued further in exile.It was in the wake of second wave 
feminism during the 1970s that “sex” gained a place in psychoanalytic discussions again. 
Debates in West Germany were strongly influenced by the reception of US-American authors 
(Shulamith Firestone, Kate Millet, Juliet Mitchell, etc.). On the one hand, feminists were 
interested in methods of (collective) self-awareness and change (“consciousness raising”), but 
on the other hand, they also expressed reservations about psychoanalysis (Hagemann-White 
1978; Koellreuter, 2000). The German-American sociologist Carol Hagemann-White explains 
this feminist discomfort with psychoanalysis. First, “a tendency for wishful thinking in order 
to avoid an ugly truth. Feminists accuse Freud, the man who describes reality, because he is in 
accord with this reality, but they deprive themselves from his insights by doing so” 
(Hagemann-White, 1978, p. 734; transl. NR) – but then again, the goals of psychotherapy 
more often than not consisted in adapting the patients to the cultural role models of 
“femininity” (Schwarzer, 1975, see Hagemann-White, 1978). Feminists finally called the 
drive model of psychoanalysis into question. Did it not start from a biologically given, 
monadic (male) subject that only uses the other as an object for its own purposes? 
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For academic Women’s Studies that developed at the time, for example for the “Munich 
approach” (Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Ilona Ostner, and others) or for the “Bielefeld 
approach” (Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, Maria Mies, Claudia Werlhof, and others), 
psychoanalysis played virtually no role. Instead, the authors drew upon learning theory 
(Scheu, 1977). However, there were attempts to adopt psychoanalysis for a feminist critique 
of society- The “Hannover approach” (Regina Becker-Schmidt, Gudrun-Axeli Knapp, and 
others) differed from others in its emphasis on the significance of mediation rather than 
deductive thinking. Contradictions in gendered subjectivity, which revealed the concept of a 
male and female social character as an ideology, became more evident (Liebisch, 1994): 
Actual women and men are not as is expected of them by social norms. The difference 
between description and legitimation that Freud had been blamed for shows when one pays 
attention to the rupture and contradictions that expose reality as conflictuous and as discordant 
with its ideology. Hannover feminists in particular have analyzed how the objective 
contradictions of women’s “double socialization” (Becker-Schmidt, 1987; transl. NR), i.e., 
women’s place in both paid labor and family, are reflected psychologically as subjective 
ambivalences.  
 
In addition to these social theoretical adaptations of psychoanalysis, the internal debate 
developed further. Margarete Mitscherlich was received well by second wave feminists, 
because she had revised the Freudian concept of “woman as a deficient being.” For her, not 
only female but also male development was marked by losses. Male development could not 
be thought of as generically human but, like female development, as particular. Men, too, are 
now “gendered” (Behnke/Meuser, 1997). Ontogenetically, it was not “masculinity” but 
“femininity” that was considered primordial in the course of identification with the mother, 
the first significant other, and boys had to give up this identification in a painful process.  
 
At the end of the 1980s, debates about the social psychological explanation of female 
perpetratorship during National Socialism took on central stage in the feminist advancement 
of psychoanalysis. Mitscherlich had proposed the thesis that female anti-Semites and National 
Socialist perpetrators developed their attitudes and committed crimes because they identified 
with the aggressor, i.e., anti-Semitic men who coped with the separation from their mothers 
with the help of projections. Thus, anti-Semitism was considered a “disease of the male” 
(Mitscherlich 1983; transl. NR). In the course of the “dispute between female historians” 
[Historikerinnenstreit] (Herkommer, 2005), Karin Windaus-Walser criticized this approach 
and called for the analysis of a distinctly “female logic” within the psychodynamic of female 
anti-Semites in order to avoid keeping National Socialism from one’s own gender by 
unconsciously avoiding guilt. Women, too, could project the repression efforts demanded of 
them in their socialization when cultural circumstances allowed them to (Becker/Stillke 1987; 
Hannemann, 2011; Prokop, 1995; Windaus-Walser, 1990). 
 
Discomfort with the drive concept, wide spread among feminists of the 1980s because it 
seemed to accord too much significance to biology, entered feminist advancements of 
psychoanalysis. Object relations theory and its successor, intersubjective psychoanalysis, 
were considered a valid alternative. These theories emphasized the ambivalent quality of (pre-
Oedipal) relationship experiences between autonomy and dependency instead of the 
contradiction between drive realization and its refusal by the environment. The works of US-
American theorists (Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, and others) animated the discussion. 
Furthermore, the family-centered argumentation that had long put a special focus on the 
conduct of concrete caregivers was replaced by symbol and language theoretical approaches. 
While “penis envy” had been put aside with reference to an alleged “natural” heterosexuality 
(e.g., Horney) in the discussions of the 1970s, later and especially French writers (e.g. Janine 
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Chasseguet-Smirgel, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Maria Torok) decoded “penis envy’ as 
“phallus envy.” Thus, envy is not directed at the penis but at that which it symbolizes 
culturally, aggressive self-assertion and “access to the mother’s body (or to the body of a 
mother substitute)” (Rohde-Dachser, 2006, p. 962; transl. NR). Taking up Judith Butler’s 
interpretation of anatomical sex difference as a result of culturally preformatted patterns of 
perception as well as the analysis of trans- and intersexuality, “penis envy” was deprived of 
the last remains of Freud’s ontologizing self-evidence (Quindeau, 2008b).  
 
In the context of new developments in socialization research (e.g. “self-socialization,” see 
Maihofer, 2002; ZSE 2002), feminists have emphasized that the acquisition of a gendered 
“grammar of desire” (Hagemann-White, 1984, p. 85; transl. NR) must be understood as a 
never-ending, active, and at times restive (mal)appropriation of cultural norms by subjects. 
The Foucauldian take on the mechanisms of discourse as both empowerment and constraint 
(Liebisch 2008) allowed for an understanding of affective attraction, but also of the suffering 
carved into these appropriations of gender “identities.” Gendered socialization does not result 
in a (passive and peaceful) »femininity« of women and a (autonomous and aggressive) 
“masculinity” of men, but always goes along with a “failure” in view of these norms (Villa 
2006). “Masculinity” and “femininity” are not coherent personality traits but – as in Freud’s 
bisexuality concept – psychological “positions” (Quindeau, 2008b, p. 95).  
 
As male development had been considered as the “normal” and generically human course of 
development for a long time, social psychological psychoanalytic masculinity research is still 
in its infancy. A paradigmatic new orientation has been developed by Ralf Pohl (2004), who 
distances himself from the “detachment paradigm” that was propounded already by 
Mitscherlich and elaborated by Robert Stoller and Ralph Greenson, and who argues (with 
recourse to Fast) that the idea of a “dis-identification’ of boys from the primary-narcissistic 
mother-child-symbiosis, as well as the resulting proto-femininity, is a retroactive (male) 
fantasy in the light of binary gendered re-categorization. “Detachment” can only be 
experienced as such after it has happened and the past can only appear as a devouring 
intimacy from the perspective of the present. “Regression” into femininity is now feared by 
boys and contrasting desires are done away with by means of projection, resulting in a 
misogynous “paranoid defense-battle-attitude” as a core element of “normal masculinity” 
(Pohl, 2004, pp. 295ff; transl. NR). 
 
As constructivist and discourse analytic approaches have triumphed in gender studies since 
the early 1990s, psychoanalytic approaches only play a marginal role in German gender 
studies (Liebsch, 2008). Nevertheless, its lively and promising advancement can be seen 
especially in its dialogue with poststructuralist approaches.  
 
The feminist critique of the drive model did not lead to the abandonment of the model 
altogether, but to its reformulation in interaction theoretical terms. In addition to French 
Lacanian psychoanalysis (e.g., Löchel, 1987; Rendtorff, 1996; Soiland, 2010), Lorenzer’s 
critical theory of the subject (see chapter 1.4.) has proved an important inspiration. Various 
authors, sometimes also taking up poststructuralist approaches, have employed Lorenzer’s 
concept of symbolic interaction forms that express (embodied) experience in culturally 
allowed (and distorted) ways – as male or as female (König, 2011; Liebsch, 1994; Rohde-
Dachser 1991; Quindeau, 2008b). Recently, Jean Laplanche’s re-conceptualization of drive 
theory has been adopted by psychoanalytic gender theories (Koellreuter, 2000, 2010; 
Quindeau, 2004, 2008b; Reiche, 1997). Koellreuter explains this recourse explicitly as a 
counterbalance to the impending “evaporation of the sexual in the theory and practice of 
feminist psychoanalysis” (Koellreuter, 2000; transl. NR; see Quindeau, 2008b). 
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3. Psychoanalysis as a method in social research 
 
Various among the above mentioned authors have also made attempts to seize psychoanalytic 
approaches systematically and methodologically for empirical social research. Important 
impulses came from the context of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, for example, 
the studies on Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, et al. 1950), in which quantitative, 
psychoanalytically inspired research on prejudice was combined with psychoanalytically 
oriented interviews, or the “group experiment,” one of the largest social scientific studies of 
the post-war era, in which attitudes and behaviors of the German population were examined 
with the help of group discussions (Pollock, 1955; see chapter 2.3.).  
 
Of central importance for a psychoanalytically inspired methodology is the so-called depth-
hermeneutical culture analysis, an approach that dates back to Alfred Lorenzer. His pointed 
emphasis on psychoanalysis as a theory of interaction and socialization is of special 
significance in this regard (see chapter 1.4.). Departing from psychoanalytic practice, he 
conceptualizes the psychoanalytic process of understanding as a “scenic understanding” 
(Lorenzer, 1977). In the psychoanalytic situation, the analyst not only aims at capturing what 
is actually said but enters the “scenes” unfolding between his/her and the analysand in the 
moment of interaction, taking part in them. The shared interaction, the play of transference 
and counter-transference, makes it possible to reconstruct a layer of meaning that evades a 
mere content analysis. The analysand’s conscious and unconscious conceptions of life, his or 
her tabooed and repressed fantasies and desires are reconstructed. This reconstruction is social 
scientific in outlook already in the clinical practice, because “the conceptions of life that are 
performed within the text are thought of as the results of primary socialization processes – as 
reflections of family structures of interaction – and secondary socialization processes – as a 
consequence of socialization by school, work, spare time, etc.” (König, 1997, p. 215; transl. 
NR).  
 
Lorenzer transfers psychoanalytic method into the realm of psychoanalytic literary 
interpretation, conceptualized as a reception analysis. The core of Lorenzer’s method transfer 
is marked by the analysis of the effect a text (or a film or a work of art) has on the reader. This 
reception analysis opens up the possibility of producing “exemplary – not representative!” 
(Haubl 1995, p. 28; transl. NR) interpretations of the latent meaning of a text but not, 
however, of analyzing the authors’ unconscious. In his method transfer, Lorenzer 
emphatically stresses the difference between clinical psychoanalysis and culture analysis, 
which is of utmost importance and cannot be over-emphasized (Lorenzer, 1986). The 
differentiation between manifest and latent text level is pivotal. “The existence of an 
autonomous level of meaning beneath the very language symbols that produce meaning must 
be acknowledged. While the manifest meaning of a text is located on the level of socially 
acknowledged figures of consciousness, a level of meaning that is effective without language, 
the level of unconscious interaction forms urges into consciousness with the latent meaning of 
a text” (Lorenzer, 1986, p. 29; transl. NR). Lorenzer understands these unconscious 
interaction forms (see Chapter 1.4.) as conceptions of possible social interactions in which 
socially tabooed and repressed ideas, wishes, and affects find their expression. Even if these 
conceptions do not enter the manifest text via language symbols, they still have an effect on it. 
This effect shows as ambiguity and imagery of the text but also as a destruction of language: 
as abrupt changes of subject, slips, gaps, and verbal unsoundness. Such inconsistencies 
provide a particularly productive access to the latent meaning of a text.  
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Bereswell et al. (2010) offer the following argument for using depth-hermeneutics not only 
for literary texts and other cultural products like films, images, and sculptures, but also for 
interviews and group discussions. Everyday social interactions, as well, have an unconscious 
layer of meaning that gains expression outside of consciousness. When researchers collect 
empirical data in which people interact, these interactions contain traces of unconscious 
meaning (see Löchel, 1997). Scenic understanding aims at these traces. Following Lorenzer 
(1986), who emphasizes the differences between scenic understanding in the clinical setting 
and in culture analysis, Morgenroth (1990) calls for using a modified form of scenic 
understanding for social research the core of which is collective interpretation in 
interpretation groups. This group interpretation moves back and forth between a detailed and 
standardized reading of the empirical material and the reflection of irritations, affects, and 
conflicts the material effects on the group. Morgenroth (2010b) defines these reactions with a 
broader notion than counter-transference. As the interpreters’ inner reaction to the 
unconscious meaning that arises and is reproduced in the interaction between researchers and 
participants in the course of the collection of data, i.e., in group discussions or interviews. The 
“‘scene,’ that emerges in the primary research relationship, […] will be ‘housed’ in the 
interview data and will then reappear in the secondary research relationship. In other words, a 
depth-hermeneutic perspective assumes that, as the data are read and discussed by an 
interpretation panel, so the scene will re-emerge in the feelings of and the relations among 
panel members” (ibid., p. 277). When these interactions are taken as serious and reflected 
carefully, they offer insight into the latent meaning structure of the empirical material.  
For psychoanalytic social psychology, aspects that are – not always, but often – neglected in 
social research are of vital importance: reflecting on the research relationship, the subjectivity 
of researchers, their emotional reactions to the research topic, irritations and conflicts in the 
interpretation group. Since the 1980s, and mostly thanks to the efforts of social researchers 
like Rolf Haubl (1991, 1993, 1995, Haubl/Liebsch 2009), Hans-Dieter König (2001, 2006, 
2008), Thomas Leithäuser and Birgit Volmerg (1988; Leithäuser; Volmerg/Volmerg, 1983), 
Elfriede Löchel (1997), and Christine Morgenroth (1990, 2010a and b), depth-hermeneutic 
culture analysis has been developed to a methodical instrument within qualitative social 
research. A special feature that critical social psychology shares with therapeutic 
psychoanalysis is certainly its emancipative aspiration. What is at stake is “enlightenment and 
the abolition” of those constraints “that impair people’s lives and hinder them from living 
their lives according to their own needs” (Volmerg, 1988, p. 36; transl. NR). Against this 
backdrop, psychoanalytic social psychology can further develop as a kind of action research 
that would as such have methodical affinities to Brückner’s political psychology (see chapter 
1.4.). Taking back research results into the research field and reflecting on the results together 
with the participants is, however, still an exception rather than the rule.  
 
Parallel to, and partly in overlap with depth-hermeneutics, ethno-psychoanalysis, too, has 
been established as an instrument of qualitative research. Ethno-psychoanalysis has been 
taken up by researchers who conduct field research and/or interviews in particular, because it 
directs its attention even more decidedly on the process of data collection and the researcher’s 
own role within the research process (see chapter 1.5.). An important venue, especially during 
the 1980s, was the Ethnological Seminar at the University of Zurich, where Maya Nadig and 
Mario Erdheim lectured. Their criticism, which aimed at the neglect of human relations and 
libidinous and aggressive drives in science and the “destruction of scientific experience by the 
academic milieu” (Nadig/Erdheim, 1988; transl. NR) going along with it, caught the interest 
of younger researchers. Ethno-psychoanalytic research starts from the assumption that un-
reflected counter-transferences influence both the research process and theory construction, 
thus, reflecting on the research process and one’s own experience by means of participatory 
observation, e.g., by using research journals and group reflections, is an integral part of ethno-
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psychoanalytic study designs. In this context, the works of Hans Bosses (1994) deserve 
mention. With his ethno-hermeneutic, Bosses developed an empirical approach of ethno-
psychoanalysis that combines ethnographic, sociological, psychoanalytic, and group-analytic 
methods of interpretation in a productive method. 
 
Maya Nadig and Johannes Reichmayr (1997) have argued that ethno-psychoanalysis can 
readily be taken up by and fit in with recent discussions in ethnology, cultural studies, the 
social sciences, and the arts and humanities, which are influenced by the poststructuralist 
paradigm change. This holds for much psychoanalytically inspired research. Methodical 
aspects that have been pivotal for psychoanalytic approaches all along, have gained increasing 
relevance: Qualitative research (drawing on exemplary reconstructions of cases and narrative 
meaning, among others), transparency within the research relationship by means of reflecting 
dynamics of transference and counter-transference and the situatedness of knowledge, 
integrating subjective and emotional dimensions into the research process, contextualizing 
and specifying instead of categorizing, and drawing on the sequentiality and process-oriented 
nature of research and the research relationship. The lack of the necessary multiple 
qualifications among researchers is still a problem that could be solved by cultivating inter- 
and transdisciplinary collaborations especially in the realm of method training.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this overview, we have reconstructed the history of critical social psychology on the one 
hand and have discussed exemplary important topics on the other hand. We want to repeat 
that we make no claims of having offered a complete overview. A more detailed overview 
would have to integrate other important topics of critical psychoanalytic social psychology 
(for example, studies on the class consciousness of workers, on the German unification and on 
German nationalism, on the past of East Germany and its consequences, and the field of 
psychoanalytic analysis of organizations and institutions, etc.). Furthermore, the overview of 
developments since the 1980s would have to be extended – a requirement we could not fulfill 
in this paper. The places at which psychoanalytic social psychology could get institutionalized 
at universities during the 1960s and 1970s were a fruitful soil on which psychoanalytic social 
psychological research could flourish. We will name only a few as representatives of many 
others: Lilli Gast in Berlin, Rolf Haubl, Hans-Joachim Busch, and Hans-Dieter König in 
Frankfurt, Heiner Keupp and Gudrun Brockhaus in Munich, Thomas Leithäuser and Birgit 
Volmerg in Bremen, and Alfred Krovoza, Regina Becker-Schmidt, and Rolf Pohl in 
Hannover. The generation of researchers who are pursuing their PhDs and habilitations at the 
moment have hardly succeeded in getting institutionalized by now – not least because of 
changing power structures at universities. Psychoanalytic social psychology shares the ‘fate’ 
of many critical scientific endeavors; it has been increasingly marginalized and excluded from 
universities. Certainly, this also has to do with the fact that German speaking critical 
psychoanalytic social psychology has been rather separatist and self-referential up until the 
1980s: Only occasionally did it take up new psychoanalytic, sociological, and critical theories 
that could have been productive for the answering of its questions but also for the generation 
of new research questions. Furthermore, it restricted itself to debates and topics that were 
carried out in the German language or were accessible in it – international reception was 
lacking for the most part. This does not only come as a disadvantage. First, it allows for a 
discussion of certain core issues that is carried out under ever new historic circumstances. 
Second, the “outmoded” psychoanalytic social psychology maintained a critical potential in 
the face of the “Zeitgeist,” but also in regard to other and newer critical approaches in subject 
theory and social theory. It is especially the – according to changing historical conditions and 
problems – ever renewed reflection on psychoanalytic subject theory and the question of how 
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to conceptualize the embedding of subject formation within social relations, the interrelation 
of individual and social history, and the dialectic of individual and society that always has 
been and still is productive.  
 
The future of critical psychoanalytic social psychology will depend on whether it succeeds in 
staying or becoming visible, scientifically, politically, and socially, with its theories, methods, 
and topics, and on the borders and transitions between other (critical) approaches and 
disciplines. It is not only the re-establishment of psychoanalytic social psychologies at 
universities that is at stake here, but also the continuation of its political potential. Its 
aspiration of working towards an emancipative restructuring of the societal status quo must 
not be abandoned. For this end, psychoanalytic social psychology also needs to stay in critical 
dialogue with political and social agents, with people acting, hoping, and suffering.  
 
The currently precarious institutional situation of psychoanalytic social psychology is not only 
a disadvantage.. First, with the younger generation of psychoanalytically oriented social 
psychologists, it also has an activating and (re-)politicizing effect that becomes visible in a 
multitude of new co-operations, conferences, and publications. In the realm of science 
politics, it aims at making visible the knowledge potential of psychoanalytic social 
psychology and at interfering with public discourses and political struggles. Second, the 
institutional eradication revealed the lack of inclusion of other advanced strands of critical 
theories. It is no wonder, then, that the desire to open up and to create dialogue, discussions, 
and alliances, as well as to transgress the boundary of the German language and to establish 
international exchange is very evident at the moment. With our overview of the history of 
critical psychoanalytic social psychology in the German speaking countries, we hope to have 
made its potential accessible to non-German-speaking critical psychologists and to have 
helped realize this desire for international exchange.  
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